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Anupam Chander*
ABSTRACT
Explanations for the success of Silicon Valley focus on the confluence of
capital and education. In this Article, I put forward a new explanation, one
that better elucidates the rise of Silicon Valley as a global trader. Just as
nineteenth-century American judges altered the common law in order to
subsidize industrial development, American judges and legislators altered the
law at the turn of the Millennium to promote the development of Internet
enterprise. Europe and Asia, by contrast, imposed strict intermediary liability
regimes, inflexible intellectual property rules, and strong privacy constraints,
impeding local Internet entrepreneurs. This study challenges the conventional
wisdom that holds that strong intellectual property rights undergird
innovation. While American law favored both commerce and speech enabled
by this new medium, European and Asian jurisdictions attended more to the
risks to intellectual property rights holders and, to a lesser extent, ordinary
individuals. Innovations that might be celebrated in the United States could
lead to imprisonment in Japan. I show how American companies leveraged
their liberal home base to become global leaders in cyberspace. I argue that
nations seeking to incubate their own Silicon Valley must focus on freeing
speech, and so must the United States, if it hopes not to break this new
industry.
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INTRODUCTION1
Nearly every company set up in a garage in Silicon Valley hopes to take
over the world. There is reason for such optimism. Again and again, Silicon
Valley firms have become the world’s leading providers of Internet services.
How did Silicon Valley become the world’s leading supplier of Internet
services?
Popular explanations for Silicon Valley’s recent success revolve around
two features. First, Silicon Valley bestrides the great academic centers of
Stanford University and the University of California, Berkeley, and sits near
the artistic and intellectual hub of San Francisco. Second, the center of venture
capital in the United States also happens to be in Menlo Park, California,
allowing both industries to profit from each other in a symbiotic relationship.
But education and money coincide in other parts of the United States as well.
Why did those parts not prosper in the manner of Silicon Valley? More
fundamentally, did not the Internet make geography irrelevant? Scholars
answer that Silicon Valley’s advantage lies in the economies of
agglomeration.2 Ronald Gilson argued that California’s advantage was its labor
law, which he believes encourages “knowledge spillovers” and agglomeration
economies by facilitating employee mobility.3 While these standard accounts
do much to explain the dynamism of Silicon Valley relative to other parts of
the United States, they do not explain the relative absence of such Internet

1 This Article was inspired by the research and writing of a subsection, also called “How Law Made
Silicon Valley,” in a recent book by the author. See ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW
THE WEB BINDS THE WORLD IN COMMERCE 55–58 (2013). Some portions of this Article’s introduction were
previously published in that book. See id.
2 ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND
ROUTE 128, at 6, 8 (1994) (“Dense networks of social relations play an important role in integrating the firms
in Silicon Valley’s fragmented industrial structure.”). In more recent work, Saxenian describes how diasporas
help power innovation across the world. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS: REGIONAL ADVANTAGE
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2006).
3 Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley,
Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 (1999) (“Postemployment covenants
not to compete have the potential to restrict seriously the movement of employees between existing firms and
to start-ups and, hence, to restrict seriously employee-transmitted knowledge spillovers.”); see also James
Pooley & Mark Lemley, California Restrictive Employee Covenants After Edwards, 23 CAL. LAB. & EMP. L.
REV., Jan. 2009, at 3, 29 (“California’s long-standing ban on employee covenants not to compete is a
centerpiece of state innovation policy, and it is perhaps the most important reason why California has enjoyed
its leading position in the technology industries over the past twenty-five years.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez &
David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 640–47 (2012) (describing
“agglomeration economies”).
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innovation hubs outside the United States, or the success of Silicon Valley
enterprises across the world.4
Law played a far more significant role in Silicon Valley’s rise and its
global success than has been previously understood. It enabled the rise of
Silicon Valley while simultaneously disabling the rise of competitors across
the world. In this Article, I will argue that Silicon Valley’s success in the
Internet era has been due to key substantive reforms to American copyright
and tort law that dramatically reduced the risks faced by Silicon Valley’s new
breed of global traders.5 Specifically, legal innovations in the 1990s that
reduced liability concerns for Internet intermediaries, coupled with low privacy
protections, created a legal ecosystem that proved fertile for the new
enterprises of what came to be known as Web 2.0. I will argue that this
solicitude was not accidental—but rather a kind of cobbled industrial policy
favoring Internet entrepreneurs. In a companion paper, Uyên Lê and I show
that these aspects of copyright and tort law were not driven by commercial
considerations alone, but were undergirded in large part by a constitutional
commitment to free speech.6 As we argue there, a First Amendment-infused
legal culture that prizes speech offered an ideal environment in which to build
the speech platforms that make up Web 2.0.
I will compare the legal regimes not between Silicon Valley and Boston’s
Route 128, but between the United States and key technological competitors
across the globe. The indulgence of American law for Internet enterprise
appears in sharper relief when contrasted with the legal regimes faced by web
entrepreneurs elsewhere. In Europe, concerns about copyright violations and
strict privacy protections hobbled Internet startups. Asian web enterprises
faced not only copyright and privacy constraints, but also strict intermediary
liability rules. I will contrast the leading cyberlaw statutes and cases in the
United States, with their explicit embrace of commerce and speech, with those

4 Tim Devaney & Tom Stein, Can Ireland Offer Startups Something Silicon Valley Can’t?, READWRITE
(Dec. 24, 2012), http://readwrite.com/2012/12/24/can-ireland-offer-startups-something-silicon-valley-cant
(Even though “just about every country with a high-speed network and a national budget has hatched a ‘startup
ecosystem[,]’ . . . [n]one has succeeded. The Dropboxes and Instagrams of the world still flock to the original
Silicon Valley.”).
5 My focus here is on Silicon Valley in its current non-silicon-based-life form, not its previous
incarnations. For an account of the rise of early industry in the region, see CHRISTOPHE LÉCUYER, MAKING
SILICON VALLEY: INNOVATION AND THE GROWTH OF HIGH TECH, 1930–1970 (2006).
6 Anupam Chander & Uyên Lê, The Free Speech Foundations of Cyberlaw (UC Davis Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 351, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2320124.
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from Europe and Asia, which are more attendant to the risks of this new
medium for existing interests. I will show that Google and Yahoo were so
worried that Japanese copyright law would make search engines illegal that
they placed their search servers offshore.7 A Japanese computer science
professor advised his students to publish their software outside Japan.8 British
Prime Minister David Cameron suggested that Google’s search engine might
have been illegal under English copyright law.9
This Article upends the conventional wisdom, which sees strong
intellectual property protections as the key to innovation—what the World
Intellectual Property Organization calls a “power tool” for growth.10
Understanding the reasons for Silicon Valley’s global success is of more than
historical interest. Governments across the world, from Chile to Kenya to
Russia, seek to incubate the next Silicon Valley.11 My review suggests that
overly rigid intellectual property laws can prove a major hurdle to Internet
innovations, which rely fundamentally on empowering individuals to share
with each other. This study helps make clear what is at stake in debates over
new laws such as the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and its relatives,
highlighting the effect of these laws on Silicon Valley’s capacity for

7

See infra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWER TOOL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2d ed.
2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/888/wipo_pub_888_
1.pdf.
11 Ryan Underwood, The Silicon Valley of South America?, INC., Apr. 2011, at 96; Katrina Manson,
Kenya Breaks Ground on Africa’s Silicon Savannah, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/
beyond-brics/2013/01/23/kenya-breaks-ground-on-africas-silicon-savannah/; Simon Shuster, Russia Plans a
Silicon Valley, TIME, Apr. 19, 2010, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1978772,00.html;
see also John Boudreau, China Strives to Create Its Own Silicon Valley, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 7,
2012, at A1; Alexandra A. Seno, Is Silicon Asia Sprouting?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 2002, at E10 (“Would-be
Silicon Valleys are springing up throughout the region, from the $1.7 billion Cyberport in Hong Kong to the
$5 million Greater Phuket Digital Paradise in Thailand, several mini-valleys in Vietnam, Indonesia’s Bandung
High-Technology Valley and, of course, the $20 billion Malaysian mother of all these clones, the Multimedia
Super Corridor.”); Cameron Reveals Silicon Valley Vision for East London, BBC (Nov. 3, 2010, 8:37 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11689437.
8
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innovation.12 I show that government has the power to enable, or disable, a
new industry. The power to make in this case implies the power to break.13
Innovation scholars worry about the “valley of death,” the stage between
start-up idea and successful commercialization, in which most start-up
enterprises founder.14 Cyber scholars fond of citing Joseph Schumpeter’s
“creative destruction” need to attend to his focus as well on the finance needed
by innovators.15 Imagine the boardroom in a Silicon Valley venture capital
firm, circa 2005. A start-up less than a year old has already attracted millions
of users. Now that start-up, which is bleeding money, needs an infusion of cash
to survive and scale up. The start-up lets people share text, photos, and videos,
and includes the ability to readily share text, pictures, and videos posted by
one’s friends. If that start-up can be accused of abetting copyright infringement
on a massive scale, or must police its content like a traditional publishing
house lest it face damages claims or an injunction, your hundred-million-dollar
investment might simply vanish to plaintiffs’ lawyers in damages and fees.16
12

Moves that might further hamstring Internet enterprises are under consideration elsewhere as well. For
example, a draft communiqué from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development proposes to
take away some of the liability protections that intermediaries have for copyright infringement. Rick Mitchell,
OECD Says Net Policy Should Protect IP Rights, but Limit Provider Liability, 16 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP.
1168 (2011).
13 Indeed, legal scholars concerned about SOPA warned Congress not to “break the Internet.” Mark
Lemley et al., Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.
org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-34_0.pdf. Many have raised similar alarms about the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, and patent law. See, e.g., JAMES
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT (2009); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 1044–46
(2011) (describing the “ACTA Boomerang” harming domestic industry); Jessica E. Vascellaro, The Valley:
Firms Fear Patent War, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2011, at A16A; Margot Kaminski, Plurilateral Trade
Agreements Lack Protections for Users, Intermediaries, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2011, 11:47 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/10/27/plurilateral-trade-agreements-lack-protections-for-usersintermediaries/. Considering the late opposition that ended SOPA, Google’s Larry Page suggests, “10 or 20
years from now, we’ll look back and say we were a millimeter away from regulating [the Internet] out of
existence.” Steven Levy, Google’s Larry Page on Why Moon Shots Matter, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/business/2013/01/ff-qa-larry-page/all/.
14 Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 45 LES NOUVELLES 185, 192 & n.35
(2010) (noting that the phrase was “popularized by Congressman Vernon Ehlers, himself a Ph.D. physicist
when the term was used in a Report to Congress by the Science Committee, of which he was Vice-Chair in
1998”).
15 Schumpeter, who served as Finance Minister of Austria in 1919, described the banker as “the ephor of
the exchange economy.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 74 (Redvers
Opie trans., 1934).
16 This hypothetical finds real-world inspiration in a recent story. Matt Lynley, Pinterest: We’re Not
Going to Be Sued into Oblivion, and Here’s Why, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2012, 3:01 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/pinterest-were-not-going-to-be-sued-into-oblivion-and-heres-why-2012-3;
Hayley
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An injunction might stop the site from continuing without extensive human
monitoring that could not be justified by potential revenues. Because of the
insulation brought by U.S. law reforms in the 1990s, American start-ups did
not fear a mortal legal blow. The legal privileges granted to Internet enterprises
in the United States helped start-ups bridge the valley of death.
Let me anticipate criticism. First, legal realists might object that I have
spoken about law on the books. What about law in action? I demonstrate
through actual cases the practical importance of the liberal American law and
the strict European and Asian laws. Second, some might seek to trivialize my
thesis: law always matters to the success of an enterprise because it could have
made that enterprise illegal, but did not. That is not my claim; rather, my claim
is that U.S. authorities (but not those in other technologically advanced states)
acted with deliberation to encourage new Internet enterprises by both reducing
the legal risks they faced and largely refraining from regulating the new risks
they introduced. Third, some will insist that if law was relevant, it was only
because it got out of the way. After all, the last person hired at a Silicon Valley
start-up is the lawyer. The story of Silicon Valley is not only a story of brilliant
programmers in their garages, but also a legal environment specifically shaped
to accommodate their creations.
My claim may resonate with students of American legal history. Morton
Horwitz famously argued that nineteenth-century American courts modified
liability rules to favor the coming of industrialization.17 I suggest an even more
widespread effort, with the Executive, Congress, and the Courts, each in their
own way promoting Internet enterprise. Horwitz decried the nineteenthcentury’s laws’ implicit subsidy to industrialists, which he saw as being borne
on the backs of society’s least fortunate.18 The limitations on Internet
intermediary liability and the lack of omnibus privacy protections beyond
those that are promised contractually by websites mean that there is a price to
be paid for the amazing innovation of the past two decades. Even while we
celebrate innovation, we must recognize its costs.
Tsukayama, Pinterest Addresses Copyright Concerns, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2012), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2012-03-15/business/35447213_1_ben-silbermann-pinterest-content; see also infra note
292 and accompanying text.
17 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860 (1977). This thesis has
its critics. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1981); Grant Gilmore, From Tort to Contract: Industrialization
and the Law, 86 YALE L.J. 788, 794 (1977) (book review); Eben Moglen, The Transformation of Morton
Horwitz, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1042 n.2 (1993) (book review) (collecting criticism).
18 See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.
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I do not allege the discovery of the DNA for economic development in the
Information Age. The cyberlaw I describe here must be understood against the
broader legal, cultural, and economic background in particular societies. What
works in one jurisdiction might not work elsewhere because of differences in
the role of law, the role of norms, enforcement, and other features.19 At the
same time, a comparative exercise is highly instructive, offering experience
with different methods of achieving a desired result.20 It also helps us
recognize the impact of differing legal cultures (including what James
Whitman has called “the two Western cultures of privacy”21) on such values as
speech and enterprise.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reveals how American legislators
and courts altered the law to accommodate new Internet enterprises. Part II
shows that European and Asian nations offered relatively stricter intermediary
liability regimes and privacy protections, making illegal the new business
model embraced by their American counterparts.22 Part III calls for due
attention to the hidden price of innovation in order to avoid the “wow” to
“yuck” curve—the move from dazzlement to disgust that scholars have
identified for other new technologies.23

19 Law and development scholar Kevin Davis observes two significant reasons why universal claims are
likely to fail:

First, the law may not be necessary to induce the outcome in question because the presence of
certain other factors is sufficient; in other words, there may be substitutes for the law. A second
possibility is that the law is not sufficient to generate the outcome in question; in other words,
there may be complements for the law, in the absence of which it has no impact.
Kevin E. Davis, Legal Universalism: Persistent Objections, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 537, 540 (2010).
20 Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 351 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (“If law fulfils
functions and meets societal needs, then the lawyer’s job is to develop laws that perform these tasks (‘social
engineering’), and comparative law can help compare the ability of different solutions to solve similar
problems, and spur similar degrees of progress.”).
21 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J.
1151 (2004). Whitman distinguishes cultures focused on dignity and liberty, drawing upon Robert Post’s
conceptualization of privacy. Id. at 1167; see also Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J.
2087 (2001).
22 In another paper, yet a work in progress, I will show how Silicon Valley firms leveraged their liberal
home jurisdiction to conquer the world.
23 The Societal Implications of Nanotechnology: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci., 108th Cong. 49,
51–52 (2003) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Vicki L. Colvin, Executive Director, Center for Biological
and Environmental Nanotechnology) (observing a “wow” to “yuck” trajectory in genetically modified
organisms, and seeking to avoid it for nanotechnology).
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I. MAKING AMERICA SAFE FOR SILICON VALLEY
I review here key legal developments that enabled the rise of Web 2.0.
Each of the individual stories I tell in this Part may seem familiar.24 Yet, by
weaving these stories together, one begins to see a stunning pattern in the
larger narrative. The pattern appears even sharper when contrasted with my
survey of Europe and Asia in Part II.
In the last decade of the Millennium, the infant industry spawned by the
invention of the World Wide Web posed pressing challenges. How could we
protect children from being awash in pornography?25 Would early Internet
pioneers such as AOL and Yahoo fail in the face of claims that they abetted
defamation and other wrongs?26 Would Hollywood disappear in the face of
easy and perfect digital copying through services such as Napster? Could we
protect children from communicating with dangerous adults?27 Would
companies be at the mercy of individuals who were quicker to register
corporate trademarks as domain names?28 Would contracts entered into online,
24 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Democracy & Technology and Electronic Frontier
Foundation Supporting Appellees and Urging Affirmance at 4, Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.
2008) (No. 07-4182) (“With this broad immunity against all civil claims, Section 230 has successfully
promoted free speech and innovations on the Internet.”); Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for
Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 583 (2008). One Wired news piece even observes the connection between the CDA and the DMCA:

Paired with the 1996 Communications Decency Act, which provides similar immunity
against noncopyright claims like defamation, the DMCA made it possible for everyone from
Digg to WordPress to provide forums for users without constant fear of being sued out of
existence.
“These two protections for intermediaries have been absolutely crucial for giving us the
internet today,” says Fred von Lohmann, an internet attorney with the Electronic Frontier
Foundation . . . . “You could not run a blog without these. You couldn’t run MySpace, AOL
without these two things.”
David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA Is the Law That Saved the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008,
3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/ten-years-later/.
25 James Coates & Graeme Zielinski, Internet: Bigger Audiences, Wider Access, Less Control, CHI.
TRIB., July 4, 1997, at 1.
26 See AOL Again Involved in Complex Speech Issue, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 30, 1997, available at 1997
WLNR 3620335 (“Governor [Jim Geringer] also said that if AOL didn’t change its policy, ‘parents in
Wyoming who are using AOL should discuss whether they can support a company that allows the promotion
of torture, rape and murder.’”).
27 Robert Coles, Safety Lessons for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1997, at A11 (“The Internet can
bring into a home not only passive entertainment, like television images, but also the interactive presence of
other voices, ready to engage in conversation.”).
28 See Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered, WIRED, Oct. 1994, at 50 (discussing the speculative practice
of domain name purchases in the early 1990s).
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lacking an ink signature, prove unenforceable?29 Would e-commerce be
saddled with multiple tax obligations from the thousands of taxing jurisdictions
across the country?30
The Clinton Administration published a white paper outlining its vision for
“Global Electronic Commerce.”31 Announcing the report, President Clinton
presciently observed, “Governments can have a profound effect on the growth
of electronic commerce. By their actions, they can facilitate electronic trade or
inhibit it.”32 The report concluded that “[e]xisting laws and regulations that
may hinder electronic commerce should be reviewed and revised or eliminated
to reflect the needs of the new electronic age.”33 Most importantly, it declared
the Administration’s commitment to self-regulation: the first principle
announced that “[t]he private sector should lead,” and the second principle that
“[g]overnments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce.”34
That preference for self-regulation over governmental intrusions would mark
congressional activity during this period. This meant even carving out Internet
enterprises from the reach of existing law. The Administration’s simple
mandate: “Let a thousand Web sites bloom.”35
Congress responded to the rise of the Internet with a flurry of laws. These
are the laws of this fruitful period, in chronological order: the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),36 the Internet Tax Freedom Act,37 the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA),38 the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA),39 the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
29 Geanne Rosenberg, Legal Uncertainty Clouds Status of Contracts on Internet, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
1997, at D3 (“[B]usiness managers, corporate lawyers and legal scholars [are] uncertain about the
enforceability of electronic agreements. The uncertainty has had a chilling effect, even at computer-astute
places . . . . Lawmakers are scrambling to fill the gap between technology and the law.”).
30 S. REP. NO. 105-276, at 4 (1998) (citing 6,600 potential taxing jurisdictions within the United States).
31 WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
(1997), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html. A draft of the white paper was
published in 1996.
32 Message to Internet Users on Electronic Commerce, 2 PUB. PAPERS 901, 902 (July 1, 1997).
33 CLINTON & GORE, supra note 31.
34 Id.
35 John M. Broder, Let It Be: Ira Magaziner Argues for Minimal Internet Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 1997, at D1.
36 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47 U.S.C.).
37 Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-719 to -726 (1998).
38 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XIII, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681728 to -735 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§6501–6506 (2012)).
39 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
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(ACPA),40 and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act (E-Sign).41
Taken together, these statutes helped undergird a legal framework that
proved conducive to the development of Internet-based services. While the
titles of these statutes often professed consumer-oriented goals—a remarkable
list including decency, tax freedom, privacy, and consumer protection—
commercial concerns were never far from the table, as we will see. I review
below the CDA and the DMCA, statutes that proved especially significant for
Silicon Valley enterprises over the course of the following decade.42 I also
consider the crucial judicial interpretations that bent the law to foster web
innovation.
We see that each of the branches of government played an integral part in
this endeavor. In the face of calls for legal protections, the Clinton
Administration promoted self-regulation by the Internet industry. Congress
wrote a set of statutes that dealt with some of the principal concerns of both the
content industry and the public, without placing too much in the way of
burdensome constraints on Silicon Valley enterprise. The Courts, for their part,
sought to protect speech and promote innovation by reading immunity statutes
broadly and striking down statutes that might chill speech. At the same time,
each of the branches checked the others when they proved less than friendly to
Internet innovation. Congress embraced the DMCA’s Title II, even where the
Clinton Administration was initially inclined to favor copyright holders; the
40 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -552
(1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, and 28 U.S.C.).
41 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464
(2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–7031). Another statute, the Child Online Protection Act, a successor to
the Communications Decency Act, never took effect, having been enjoined in ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d
473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), and permanently enjoined in ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007),
aff’d sub nom. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008).
42 The other statutes proved useful, each in its own way. The Internet Tax Freedom Act helped inform
the widespread (if erroneous) view that Internet commerce was a tax-free zone. Rather than a tax holiday for
transactions conducted via the Internet, the statute simply banned special taxes that discriminated against the
Internet or taxes on obtaining Internet service to one’s home or business. By banning taxes on Internet access,
the statute made Internet access itself cheaper. The perception that Internet-mediated transactions were tax-free
likely contributed to the willingness of many individuals to buy goods from unseen and often unfamiliar online
merchants, helping companies like eBay and Amazon. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
helped alleviate the concerns of trademark holders during the rapid development of cyberspace. E-Sign helped
assure the acceptance of painless electronic contracting, imposing no formal requirements on contracts
executed via the Internet. E-Sign overrode efforts such as those in Utah to require a particular technology for
clearly enforceable contracts—an approach that might have created a cumbersome obstacle to widespread
adoption of Internet contracting. Jane K. Winn & Robert A. Witte, E-Sign of the Times, E-COMMERCE L. REP.,
July 2000, at 2, 8.
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Courts declared unconstitutional the anti-pornography restrictions imposed by
Congress; and Congress offered safe harbors for intermediary liability even
where courts were sometimes inclined to impose broader liability. Thus, this
was a cobbled industrial policy, halting and inconsistent, yet ultimately adding
up to a powerful set of pro-Internet laws.
A. Intermediary Liability
The first of this series of statutes, the Communications Decency Act,
proved central to the rise of the new breed of Silicon Valley enterprise. This
hardly seemed likely for a statute directed against indecent speech. The CDA
made it a crime to display obscene or indecent material to persons who were
less than eighteen years of age, unless the site had taken appropriate measures
such as an age-verified credit card to restrict access to adults.43 Hidden within
the statute was a small fateful section, § 230,44 that would save many
corporations—most of them not even dreamed of when the Act was passed—
from potentially ruinous legal challenges.
What risks did such firms face? By offering platforms for users across the
world, Internet enterprises faced the hazard that some users would use these
platforms in ways that violated the law, bringing with it the possibility of
liability for aiding and abetting that illegal activity. Consider a sampling of the
array of claims that might lie against these platforms for the behavior of their
users. Yahoo might be liable if someone uses Yahoo Finance to circulate a
false rumor about a public company. Match.com could face liability if a
conniving user posted defamatory information about another individual.
Craigslist might be liable under fair housing statutes if a landlord put up a
listing stating that he preferred to rent to people of a particular race. Amazon
and Yelp might be liable for defamatory comments written by a few of their
legions of reviewers.
The risks were made apparent in 1995 in the case of Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Services Co.45 There, an investment firm, allegedly defamed on an
Internet bulletin board, sued that board’s owner, Prodigy. The New York trial
court held that Prodigy could be liable as a publisher because it had advertised
43

Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec 502, § 223(a), (e)(5), 110 Stat. 56,
133–34 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006)).
44 Id. at sec 509, § 230, 110 Stat. at 137 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230).
45 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, § 230, 110 Stat. 56, 137, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp.
of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d. 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
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its editorial control over the site.46 Even in this decision, marking a high point
of liability concerns, the court was mindful of the impact on new Internet
enterprises, which might follow the decision’s logic and simply disavow any
editorial control and thereby avoid any liability. The court argued that “the
market will . . . compensate a network for its increased control and the
resulting increased exposure.”47 There is economic logic to this, but it may be
that the costs of monitoring are so high as to create a service that is too
expensive to attract sufficient buyers. While it might be relatively cheap to
monitor for pornography or indecent words, it is far more difficult to evaluate
factual claims made in the thousands of posts on a particular site. More
importantly, the court’s vision of the metered website is quite different than the
cyberspace that actually flourished after Stratton Oakmont was undone by
statute the following year.
Despite the trial court’s assurances of market compensation to come, the
industry was understandably alarmed at the ruling. It turned to Congress to
fashion a remedy. In a short section embedded within the Communications
Decency Act, Congress undid Stratton Oakmont. Under the subsection heading
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive
material” (no Good Samaritan behavior was actually required for the main
§ 230 immunity to attach), Congress declared that online service providers
could never be treated as publishers for material they did not develop.48 As
interpreted by courts, the section largely immunized online service providers
from secondary liability for most torts committed through their service.49 The
section offered online publishers an immunity that their offline compatriots
never enjoyed. One student commentator compares the treatment of Soldier of
Fortune magazine, held liable in 1992 for millions of dollars in damages for
permitting an advertisement that led, tragically, to an actual murder-for-hire, to
an online newspaper that would avoid similar liability because of § 230.50
46 Id. at *5. The plaintiffs initially claimed an astonishing $200 million in damages. Peter H. Lewis, After
Apology from Prodigy, Firm Drops Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1995, at D1 (noting that the firm ultimately
agreed to drop its $200 million libel lawsuit against Prodigy in return for Prodigy saying sorry).
47 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
48 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
49 One need only consider an alternative suggestion by Missouri Congresswoman Danner to sense the
array of paths not taken: “Mr. Chairman, . . . . [t]elephone companies must inform us as to whom our long
distance calls are made. I believe that if computer online services were to include itemized billing, it would be
a practical solution which would inform parents as to what materials their children are accessing on the
Internet.” 141 CONG. REC. 22,046 (1995) (emphasis added) (statement of Rep. Pat Danner).
50 Ryan French, Comment, Picking up the Pieces: Finding Unity After the Communications Decency Act
Section 230 Jurisprudential Clash, 72 LA. L. REV. 443, 443–44 (2012).
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Congress justified this differential treatment on the ground that “[t]he Internet
and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of
political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity.”51 Furthermore, Congress sought “to preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.”52 Congress thus sought to simultaneously promote the speech
potential of a largely self-regulated Internet, while fostering the rise of Internet
enterprises.53 Indeed, though largely unheralded at the time, the section proved
a lifeline to Web 2.0 enterprises.
For their part, courts read the mandate in § 230 broadly, defining
“interactive computer service” broadly, and as covering a large array of claims,
both state and federal (but excluding intellectual property claims, as per the
statute’s directions). Most importantly, they not only eliminated a website’s
liability as a publisher, but also as a distributor. Where publishers typically
faced strict liability, distributors such as a library or bookstore would be liable
if they had knowledge of the wrongdoing and still refused to act.54 In Zeran v.
America Online, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that § 230 must be read to
eliminate distributor liability, as well as publisher liability, for web services.55
The court reasoned that a contrary holding would chill speech because it would
create a natural incentive for service providers to take down information that
some user found offensive for fear of liability for letting it remain: “Because
service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive
simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were
defamatory or not.”56 Other circuits followed Zeran’s broad reading,
eliminating distributor liability as an incident of the defense against publisher
liability.57

51

47 U.S.C § 230(a)(3).
Id. § 230(b)(2).
53 See id. § 230(a).
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 799, 803–04, 810–12 (5th ed. 1984); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Irreconcilable
Differences? Congressional Treatment of Internet Service Providers as Speakers, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC.
70, 73–74 (2001).
55 129 F.3d 327, 332–33 (4th Cir. 1997).
56 Id. at 333.
57 Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Am.
Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 2001).
52
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Again and again, § 230 proved invaluable to shield web enterprises from
lawsuits, as demonstrated by a plethora of cases.58 Perhaps every major
58 See, e.g., Shrader v. Beann, 503 F. App’x 650 (10th Cir. 2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize the
operators of an online messaging board against defamatory contents posted by third-party users), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 102 (2013); Getachew v. Google, Inc., 491 F. App’x 923 (10th Cir. 2012) (relying on § 230 to
immunize Google against negative information about Plaintiff found with Google’s search engine); Simmons
v. Danhauer & Assocs., 477 F. App’x 53 (4th Cir. 2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize an online auction
service against error committed by a user); Black v. Google, Inc., 457 F. App’x 622 (9th Cir. 2011) (relying on
§ 230 to immunize Google against defamatory comments posted by a user); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785
(8th Cir. 2010) (relying on § 230 to immunize an Internet service provider against allegedly defamatory
statements posted on Defendant’s website); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250
(4th Cir. 2009) (relying on § 230 to immunize a website operator against allegedly defamatory comments
posted by users); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (relying on § 230 to immunize MySpace
from a negligence claim arising from the sexual assault on a fourteen-year-old girl who was assaulted after
meeting the assailant through the service); DiMeo v. Max, 248 F. App’x 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (relying on § 230
to immunize an online bulletin board service for claims arising out of a user’s allegedly defamatory postings);
Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2007) (relying on § 230 to immunize Google against claims
for defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence arising out of Google’s automatic website archiving
service); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) (relying on § 230 to
immunize a web hosting service, Lycos, from claims arising out of cyber-stalking and Florida securities and
antidilution claims); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (relying on § 230 to
immunize Amazon.com for the display of a photograph of a book cover that included a photograph of
Plaintiff); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (relying on § 230 to immunize a provider of web
hosting services for the sale of illegal tapes through its services); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (relying on § 230 to immunize a matchmaking website for false content about Plaintiff);
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206 F.3d 980 (relying on § 230 to immunize an Internet service provider that
provided stock quotation information, and finding that the Internet service provider was not responsible for
wrong stock information because it was not the information content provider under the CDA); Zeran, 129 F.3d
327 (relying on § 230 to immunize a bulletin board service provider for its failure to remove allegedly
defamatory notices); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 910 F. Supp. 2d 314 (D.D.C. 2012) (relying on § 230 to
immunize Facebook against harmful pages created by third-party users); Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C. v.
Borodkin, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (D. Ariz. 2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize www.ripoffreport.com against
postings by users); Merritt v. Lexis Nexis, No. 12-CV-12903, 2012 WL 6725882 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2012)
(relying on § 230 to immunize Lexis Nexis against false statements disseminated online), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 12-12903, 2012 WL 6725881 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2012); AF Holdings, LLC
v. Doe, No. 5:12-CV-02048-EJD, 2012 WL 4747170 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize a
provider of Internet connection against the third-party posting of pirated videos on the Internet); Shah v.
MyLife.com, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-1592-ST, 2012 WL 4863696 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2012) (stating that § 230 would
immunize interactive computer service providers against the online publication of private information
provided by third parties, but dismissing for lack of jurisdiction), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:12-cv-1592-ST, 2012 WL 4863271 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2012); Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp.
2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (granting an online-advertising-service company’s motion for preliminary
injunction because § 230 likely preempts state law punishing anyone who directly or indirectly causes explicit
content to be published); Hadley v. Gatehouse Media Freeport Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 1548, 2012 WL
2866463 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize a website operator against a user’s allegedly
defamatory comments); Seldon v. Magedson, No. 11 Civ. 6218(PAC)(MHD), 2012 WL 4475274 (S.D.N.Y.
July 10, 2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize a website operator against users’ defamatory posts ), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 11 Civ. 6218(PAC)(MHD), 2012 WL 4475020 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012);
Echenique v. Google, Inc., No. 12-cv-00883-BNB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92729 (D. Colo. July 5, 2012)
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(relying on § 230 to immunize Google against search results that allegedly defamed Plaintiff and violated
Plaintiff’s privacy rights); Courtney v. Vereb, No. 12-655, 2012 WL 2405313 (E.D. La. June 25, 2012)
(relying on § 230 to immunize an online-forum provider from defamatory comments posted by a user);
Nieman v. Versuslaw, Inc., No. 12-3104, 2012 WL 3201935 (C.D. Ill. June 13, 2012) (relying on § 230 to
immunize search engine companies against online searches that allegedly defame Plaintiff and violate
Plaintiff’s privacy rights), report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-3104, 2012 WL 3201931 (C.D. Ill.
Aug. 3, 2012), aff’d, 512 F. App’x 635 (7th Cir. 2013); Price v. Gannett Co., No. 2:11-cv-00628, 2012 WL
1570972 (S.D. W. Va. May 1, 2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize operators of an online forum against
defamatory posts by unknown users on Defendants’ forum webpages); S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, No. 11-CV00392-DW, 2012 WL 3335284 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize the operator of a
website against third-party user posts that allegedly defame Plaintiff and violate Plaintiff’s privacy rights);
Ascentive, LLC v. Op. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying Plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary injunction because § 230 will likely immunize the website, PissedConsumer.com, even though the
website invited third parties to submit negative reviews); Hopkins v. Doe, No. 2:11-CV-100-RWS, 2011 WL
5921446 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2011) (relying on § 230 to immunize a website for allegedly defamatory
statements posted to the website); Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc., No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 18, 2011) (relying on § 230 to immunize eBay for allegedly defective vacuum tubes sold through the
site); Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., Nos. C-10-1321 EMC, C-10-2351 EMC, 2011 WL 5079526 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26,
2011) (relying on § 230 to immunize Yelp for allegedly manipulating user comments); Holomaxx Techs.
Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 10-cv-04924 JF (HRL), 2011 WL 3740813 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (relying
on § 230 to immunize Microsoft for computer fraud and intentional interference with contract when
Microsoft’s spam blocker blocked Plaintiff’s advertising e-mail); M.A. ex rel P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media
Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (relying on § 230 to immunize the publisher of a
website against a claim that the website was used by a convicted child trafficker); Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric
Ventures LLC, No. CV 10-01360 SVW (PJWx), 2011 WL 2469822 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (relying on § 230
to immunize a consumer complaint website from liability for allegedly defamatory statements posted to the
site by users); Collins v. Purdue Univ., 703 F. Supp. 2d 862 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (relying on § 230 to immunize a
newspaper website against tort claims arising out of allegedly defamatory remarks posted by third parties);
Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (relying on § 230 to immunize Craigslist against
claims that it facilitated prostitution); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (relying
on § 230 to immunize Google for providing tools to advertisers when advertisers use the tools to post allegedly
fraudulent content); e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (relying on
§ 230 to immunize an Internet service provider for filtering or blocking e-mails the provider believes to be
objectionable in good faith); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007) (relying on § 230 to
immunize Internet service providers from claims arising from their monitoring, screening, and deleting of
content from their network); Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (relying on § 230
to immunize an online-data-gathering company that collected information from third parties about individuals
and businesses for distributing false information); Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523
(D. Md. 2006) (relying on § 230 to immunize an Internet service provider despite allegations that it knew of its
customers’ potentially illegal activities); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., No.
2:04CV462FTM29SPC, 2006 WL 66724 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2006) (relying on § 230 to immunize a web
hosting service for defamation claims arising from statements on a website hosted by the service); Corbis
Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (relying on § 230 to immunize
Amazon.com for state consumer protection claims and for tortious interference with business relationships
arising out of the display of content uploaded by third parties); Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Sys., Inc.,
323 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (relying on § 230 to immunize a business that reported alleged spam emails against trade, libel, intentional interference with contractual relations, and unfair competition claims
brought by a bulk commercial e-mail business); Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (relying on § 230 to immunize Google for breach of contract and tort claims arising out of its
failure to remove material); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003) (finding
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Internet enterprise has relied on the statute to defend itself over the years. The
CDA insulated web enterprises from the reach of a variety of federal and state
causes of action, both statutory and common law.59 These include, for
example, the Federal Fair Housing Act, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Washington State Consumer Protection Act, and common law actions such
as invasion of privacy, negligence, and tortious interference with business
relations. The CDA’s § 230 was no panacea—it failed as a defense a third of
the time; it still required the Internet enterprise to engage in expensive
litigation; and, even when it proved a successful defense, a year had often
passed in the interim.60

that Defendant, an Internet service provider, is immune under the CDA and, therefore, is not responsible for
the anti-Islamic comments submitted onto its online chat rooms by users), aff’d, No. 03-1770, 2004 WL
602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D.S.D. 2001)
(relying on § 230 to immunize a provider of Internet service in a case arising out of a patron’s use of
Defendant’s service in an alleged defamation); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (relying
on § 230 to immunize AOL against defamation claims arising out of statements by a gossip columnist, even
though AOL had contracted with the gossip columnist to provide content); Stoner v. eBay Inc., No. 305666,
2000 WL 1705637 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000) (relying on § 230 to immunize eBay from claims related to the sale
of bootleg and other infringing sound records posted by users); Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011) (relying on § 230 to immunize a website operator for alleged defamation by third parties);
Delle v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., No. 11-0810, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 295 (Mass. Super. Ct.
2011) (relying on § 230 to immunize an online news website for comments posted by users); Shiamili v. Real
Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011) (relying on § 230 to immunize a website operator for
allegedly defamatory statements even though Defendants reposted these statements and added headings to the
comments); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (relying on
§ 230 to immunize an operator of a website against copyright infringement on the operator’s website), rev’d on
other grounds, 964 N.Y.S.2d 106 (App. Div. 2013); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012) (relying on § 230 to immunize an online marketplace against the sale of tickets on the marketplace in
violation of state law regulating ticket pricing), review denied, 736 S.E.2d 757 (N.C. 2013). But see
CYBERsitter, LLC v. Google Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (denying Google’s motion to
dismiss because § 230 immunity is dependent on whether Google materially contributed to the damaging
information on its website and it was too early to make such a determination); Amerigas Propane, L.P. v. Op.
Corp., No. 12-713, 2012 WL 2327788 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2012) (denying a website operator’s motion to
dismiss under § 230 because Plaintiff alleged that the website operator was the creator of some of the posts
that infringed Plaintiff’s trademark); Chang v. Wozo LLC, No. 11-10245-DJC, 2012 WL 1067643 (D. Mass.
Mar. 28, 2012) (denying Internet advertising companies’ motions to dismiss under § 230 because Plaintiff
alleged that the Internet advertising companies, at least in part, created the fraudulent Internet advertisements);
Lansing v. Sw. Airlines Co., 980 N.E.2d 630 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (holding that § 230 does not grant immunity
against a claim of negligent supervision when an employee uses Southwest’s computer and Internet to send
harassing and threatening e-mails because whether Defendant is treated as a publisher or not is irrelevant to
Plaintiff’s pled claim).
59 Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 102–
05 (2007).
60 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 493 (2010).
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Two foundational cases demonstrate the practical value of the CDA to web
enterprises. In Doe v. MySpace, Inc., the social networking site faced a claim
for liability arising from a heinous act—an assault on a minor by a nineteenyear-old man whom she met through MySpace.61 The family sued MySpace
for negligence in not verifying her age on the ground that verification would
have revealed that she was thirteen when she registered, not eighteen as she
claimed.62 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that § 230 protected
MySpace from the suit.63 The CDA also protected an Internet dating service
from a lawsuit arising from a malicious posting of a false profile on a dating
site.64 Someone using a computer in Berlin posted a profile using photos of the
actress Christianne Carafano suggesting that she was interested in meeting
men, and made her home address and phone number available.65 In Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on § 230 to
deny Carafano’s lawsuit against the owner of the dating site for invasion of
privacy, misappropriation of the right of publicity, defamation, and
negligence.66 The court ruled that “despite the serious and utterly deplorable
consequences that occurred in this case, we conclude that Congress intended
that service providers such as Matchmaker be afforded immunity from suit.”67
The court recognized that as a result of the law, “Internet publishers are treated
differently from corresponding publishers in print, television and radio.”68
With CDA § 230, both commercial and speech considerations coincided.
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Zeran, a notice and takedown system would
inevitably lead to firms generally choosing to take down controversial
statements, rather than face any specter of liability.69 As Neal Katyal writes:
“Because an ISP [Internet Service Provider] derives little utility from
providing access to a risky subscriber, a legal regime that places liability on an

61

528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 420–21.
63 Id. at 422.
64 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003).
65 Id. at 1121.
66 Id. at 1122, 1125.
67 Id. at 1125.
68 Id. at 1122.
69 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997); Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy:
The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11,
28 (2006).
62
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ISP for the acts of its subscribers will quickly lead the ISP to purge risky ones
from its system.”70
Even while § 230 offered a lifeline to Internet enterprises, the remainder of
the CDA complicated their work tremendously. Core provisions of the CDA
sought to make it difficult for children to access material judged indecent by a
community. But in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court stepped in to strike
down those provisions as a violation of the freedom of speech.71 The CDA’s
anti-indecency provisions posed a particular challenge to sites that welcomed
user content. Unless these sites verified the ages of their users, typically
through credit cards, they faced the very real possibility that someone would
post indecent material on their pages. The statute covered all
“communications,” not just images, and thus required a website administrator
to actually read through the postings of users to adjudicate decency.72 In a very
real sense then, Reno v. ACLU made possible Web 2.0.
The interaction between Congress and the Court expressed through the
CDA § 230/Reno v. ACLU pairing consisted in a legislature that immunized
Internet enterprises from the actions of others, and a court that declared that
Internet enterprises could not be made to act as censors for the state, at least
under certain terms. Neither Congress nor the Courts were consistently singleminded in their promotion of Internet enterprise, yet their interaction resulted
in precisely this. Congress overruled any court that might have sought to hold
intermediaries liable for user-generated content (other than for intellectual
property-based claims, an area we turn to next). Meanwhile the Courts
overturned congressional efforts to require Internet enterprises to censor
speech widely. The end result was a legal framework conducive to promoting
speech on the Internet through online speech intermediaries.
B. Copyright
Any technology that allows individuals to share information can lend itself
to copyright infringement. A company like Yahoo that allows individuals to
post whatever they want online faces a high risk that its service will be used for
70 Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007–08 (2001). Law and
economics scholars have argued that the problem was that users were unwilling to pay ISPs for the full social
benefit because of positive externalities from their use, and this resulted in a market failure. See, e.g., Doug
Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 225–
26 (2006).
71 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
72 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006).
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extensive copyright infringement. The company might be liable for direct
infringement every time it delivers a copy of the copyrighted work (direct
infringement being a strict liability offense), for contributory infringement if it
has knowledge and makes a material contribution to the infringement, and for
vicarious infringement if it controls and earns a direct financial benefit from
the infringement. Given that statutory damages for direct infringement alone
range from $200 to $150,000 for each work,73 and that millions of works are
copied online, the specter of liability would be enough to stop most Internet
companies dead in their tracks. This is not a hypothetical concern. Consider the
graveyard of dot-com enterprises, felled not by flawed monetization plans, but
by copyright law: MP3.com, ICraveTV.com, Aimster, Grokster, and, most
famously, Napster.74
While § 230 of the CDA protected websites against a wide variety of
claims arising out of the actions of their users, it explicitly excluded
intellectual property claims from its ambit.75 This meant that any site that
collected material provided by users might still be held liable for claims arising
out of copyright or trademark. Internet enterprises remembered well the 1993
case of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, in which a court held the operator
of an online bulletin board strictly liable for copyright infringement by users of
that board.76 The declaration by a federal court that “[i]t does not matter that
Defendant Frena may have been unaware of the copyright infringement”77
must have rattled many in Silicon Valley.78

73 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) (2012) (providing statutory damages per work of $750 to $30,000, but
permitting damages per work to be reduced to $200 in cases where the defendant was not aware, and had no
reason to believe, that infringement was occurring, or increased to $150,000 in cases of willful infringement).
For a cogent critique, see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009).
74 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, Nos. Civ. A. 00-120, Civ. A. 00-121, 2000 WL 255989 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000).
75 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
76 839 F.Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
77 Id.
78 Another federal district court refused to uphold a direct copyright infringement claim, though that
court was more willing to entertain a claim of secondary infringement. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“[I]t does not make sense to adopt a
rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in the infringement is nothing more than
setting up and operating a system that is necessary for the functioning of the Internet. . . . The court does not
find workable a theory of infringement that would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot
reasonably be deterred.”).
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The Internet industry set out to reform the law, but the content industries
resisted, as did the White House initially. In 1995, a White House task force
led by Patent Commissioner Bruce Lehman concluded that it was “premature”
to reduce legal risks for Internet intermediaries, preferring to treat them as
publishers for copyright purposes.79 Traditional publishers, of course, are
strictly liable for copyright infringement in their publications, and thus this
approach would have subjected Google and Facebook to strict liability for their
users’ actions.80 Given the volume of material they carry, it is hard to imagine
how we might have Google or Facebook today if they were to have the
publisher liability of The New York Times or Time Warner. CompuServe’s
general counsel Stephen Heaton testified before Congress that strict liability
for online service providers shifted enforcement responsibility from copyright
owners to the online enterprises.81 Requiring such enterprises to monitor the
“trillions of bits of data” that crossed their computer networks would “bring[]
their businesses to a halt, almost immediately,” he averred.82 The recording
industry denied the need for special protections for online service providers,
making plain the industry’s aversion to such special rules for online
companies:
Internet Access Providers . . . . argue that copyright liability will
stifle the growth of the Internet, chill investment in companies that
provide Internet access, and unfairly harm their companies when they
have no control over or knowledge of what users may be doing on
their network.
83
Frankly, we don’t see it.

79 INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 122 (1995)
(“The Working Group believes it is—at best—premature to reduce the liability of any type of service provider
in the [on-line] environment. On-line service providers currently provide a number of services. With respect to
the allowance of uploading of material by their subscribers, they are, in essence, acting as an electronic
publisher.”); Mike Scott, Note, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 99, 113–15 (2005).
80 See, e.g., Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559 (applying traditional copyright publisher liability to online
bulletin board service).
81 NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 (Part 2): Hearing on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
& Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 235 (1996) (statement of Stephen M.
Heaton, General Counsel and Secretary, CompuServe, Inc.).
82 Id.
83 The Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet Service Providers: Hearing on S. 1146
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15 (1997) (statement of Cary H. Sherman, Senior
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Recording Industry Association of America).
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Public interest groups, including library associations and consumer groups,
argued against expanded rights of the copyright industry online.84 Consumer
electronics firms, too, worried about expanded copyright liabilities, but the
copyright industries responded that this was merely an effort by Japanese
manufacturers to profit from American material.85
By late 1998, the copyright and information industries came to a mutual
understanding,86 reflected in a complicated set of safe harbors under which
Internet companies could seek shelter from copyright liability. With the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Congress sought to address the impact of the
digital environment on copyrighted works by (a) barring devices that
circumvented copyright protection schemes (Title I, the “WIPO Copyright and
Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998”);87 and
(b) offering companies that followed certain policies respectful of copyright
immunity from claims for copyright infringement (Title II, the “Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act” or OCILLA).88 While the
DMCA was best known for its first Title, which made it illegal to circumvent
copyright protection schemes like those found in DVD movies, the second
Title of the statute provided safe harbors for Internet enterprises from
copyright liability.89
OCILLA provided four safe harbors for commercial enterprises: the first
for the companies that bring the Internet to one’s home, the second for the
companies that make temporary copies of data being routed on the Internet, the
third for companies that host on the Internet material provided by others, and
the fourth for Internet search engines.90 The last two safe harbors in particular
proved crucial to Silicon Valley enterprises.91 As Edward Lee writes, “virtually
84

JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 125–27 (2001).
Id. at 126.
86 Cassandra Imfeld & Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Music Industry and the Legislative Development of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Online Service Provider Provision, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 291, 306–
11 (2005) (describing music industry’s “change of heart” in favor of Title II after obtaining significant changes
in draft legislation).
87 Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 101–105, 112 Stat. 2861–77 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
88 Id. §§ 201–203, 112 Stat. at 2877–86.
89 As copyright scholar Edward Lee notes, “Title I expanded copyright liability, while Title II contracted
it.” Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233, 233 (2009).
90 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012).
91 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (relying on
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)’s safe harbor to immunize a website operator against copyright infringement claims);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)’s safe harbor
provision to immunize Defendant, a provider of webhosting and Internet connectivity, from Plaintiff’s claims
85
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all commercial websites in the U.S. that deal with third-party content attempt
to follow and fall within the safe harbors. Indeed, it would be foolish, if not a
breach of corporate fiduciary duty, for any such company not to do so.”92
OCILLA achieved a modus vivendi between northern and southern
California—where Silicon Valley would banish repeat offenders and take
down material if requested by the copyright owner, often based in
Hollywood.93 By performing these duties diligently, Silicon Valley enterprises
generally managed to avoid liability for the widespread copyright infringement
that still occurred through their systems. While some have legitimately
criticized OCILLA for leading firms to take down material too quickly for fear
of jeopardizing their safe harbor,94 OCILLA marked a significant
against Defendant for providing services for websites that infringed Plaintiff’s copyrights); Viacom Int’l Inc.
v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103(LLS), 2013 WL 1689071 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013) (relying on 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c) to immunize YouTube from liability for copyrighted materials on the website that were uploaded by
third-party users, despite the fact that YouTube may have known that infringement was ubiquitous throughout
the website); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (relying on 17
U.S.C. § 512(c) to immunize Photobucket from Plaintiff’s claims that Photobucket users have copied,
displayed, and modified Plaintiff’s copyrighted material); Brown v. Way, No. 10-cv-13016, 2011 WL
3555618 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2011) (finding that 17 U.S.C. § 512 immunizes Defendant’s online message
boards from liability for its users’ postings of allegedly copyrighted content); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks,
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (relying on 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) to immunize Veoh from liability
for copyrighted videos posted on its site by third parties, even though Veoh’s website may have facilitated
users in accessing copyrighted materials); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (relying
on 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) to immunize Google from copyright claims against Google’s automatic website caching
and indexing activities); Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (relying on 17
U.S.C. § 512 to immunize eBay from liability for the third-party sale of pirated materials on eBay’s website).
But see Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying AOL’s summary judgment motion
because AOL may not satisfy the safe harbor requirements in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) because it failed to have a
working e-mail address for infringement notifications); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578
SVW(JCx), 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (denying defendants safe harbor protection because
they were aware of their users’ ongoing infringing activities), aff’d in part as modified, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
2013); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931(WHP), 2009 WL 3364036 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
16, 2009) (denying an online music storage website’s motion to dismiss against Plaintiff’s copyright
infringement claims because the website did not meet the safe harbor threshold requirements stipulated in 17
U.S.C. § 512(i)); Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying an
online bulletin board safe harbor protection because it knowingly failed to take action to prevent infringing
material).
92 Lee, supra note 89, at 234.
93 Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of
Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 983 (2007) (“When enacting the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 as the U.S. implementation of the WCT, Congress
achieved a reasonable balance of competing interests in its creation of safe harbors from copyright liability for
internet service providers (ISPs) and other intermediaries for the infringing acts of others.” (footnote omitted)).
94 Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on
the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 176 (2010) (arguing that “the copyright notice-andtakedown regime operates in the shadow of the law, silencing speech indirectly through private intermediaries
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accomplishment for Silicon Valley in creating rules that allowed Web 2.0
enterprises to flourish without either excessive copyright management costs or
high liability risks.95
In recent years, especially in the battle against SOPA, it has become
apparent that the content industry is dissatisfied with the détente struck in
1998. The extent of the content industry’s distaste for Silicon Valley is evident
in—of all things—Rupert Murdoch’s tweets. In January 2012, Murdoch used
Twitter to accuse Google of being a “[p]iracy leader.”96
Courts, too, played a central role in the flourishing of Silicon Valley
enterprise in the face of claims of copyright holders. Major advances in
information technology had put pressure on copyright holders before, and
courts had been called upon to adjudicate disputes between the two industries.
In the 1980s, courts had largely sheltered the electronics industry against
copyright infringement claims. When Sony introduced a video-cassette
recorder, Hollywood studios sued because the device could copy television
shows. The Supreme Court in 1984 in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. protected the new technology, arguing that the device had
“substantial noninfringing uses.”97 As Pamela Samuelson writes, had it not
been for the relief from liability offered by the Sony decision, “tape recorders,
photocopiers, CD burners, CD ripping software, iPods, and MP3 players, and a
host of other technologies that facilitate private or personal use copying might
have never become widely available.”98 The decision did not insulate every
new technology. Peter Menell and David Nimmer observe that, in the years
since the Sony decision, “the developers and distributors of Napster, Aimster,
Grokster, Morpheus, and KaZaA—peer-to-peer systems that have
where the government could not do so directly”); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or
“Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 622 (2006).
95 But see Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anticircumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 522–24 (1999) (arguing that the
DMCA was broader than necessary in relation to WIPO, and that the Act’s anti-circumvention provisions “do
not match up well with the needs of the digital economy”).
96 Murdoch said, “Piracy leader is Google who streams movies free, sells [advertisements] around them.”
David Carr, A Glimpse of Murdoch Unbound, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2012, at B1 (internal quotation mark
omitted).
97 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
98 Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice
Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1850 (2006); see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing
Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1356 (2004) (arguing
that the Sony rationale offered “significant protection for innovation in technologies that are related to the use
of copyrighted material”).
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noninfringing uses—have all been held liable for contributory infringement,
Sony notwithstanding.”99
Yet, the Supreme Court’s own intervention in the digital copyright, in the
case of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,100 yielded a result
that was largely friendly to Silicon Valley innovation. The movie studios and
others had invited the Court to erode the Sony rule by requiring that it be the
principal actual use of a device or service, not its potential use, that should
determine its legality.101 In arguing their cause before the Court, the copyright
industries understood that they must not be seen as standing in the way of
innovation. The songwriter plaintiffs devoted one of the three parts of their
main brief to the proposition that “[h]olding Grokster and Streamcast liable
will encourage, not restrain, legitimate commerce.”102 The motion picture
studios and recording companies argued that a holding in favor of the filesharing services would threaten “artistic innovation” as well as “obstruct[]
innovators seeking to use digital technology for lawful distribution of
copyrighted works.”103 For their part, the file-sharing services pressed the
potential chill on innovation with even greater zeal. The word “innovation”
appears no less than forty-five times in their brief. The file-sharing services
argued:
Modifying the Sony rule as petitioners suggest would . . . . deter
investment in innovation by subjecting innovators to standards that
are unpredictable in application and expensive to litigate, and put
large sectors of the digital-technology economy in the hands of
entertainment-industry incumbents with a vested interest in
preserving their existing business arrangements, to the detriment of
104
both creators and consumers.

Justice David Souter, writing for the Court, observed that the rule in Sony
“leaves breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce.”105
The Supreme Court’s decision marked the death knell for two Internet
services, Grokster and Streamcast, which could be found liable for “inducing”
99 Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability’s Continuing
Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143, 145 (2007).
100 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
101 See Reply Brief for Motion Picture Studio & Recording Co. Petitioners at 1–6, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913
(No. 04-480).
102 Brief for Songwriter & Music Publisher Petitioners at 17, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480).
103 Reply Brief for Motion Picture Studio & Recording Co. Petitioners, supra note 101, at 11–12.
104 Brief for Respondents at 14, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480).
105 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933.
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copyright infringement.106 Yet, the Grokster decision itself largely continued to
extend the Court’s welcome mat for innovation, even where the service (like
any digital information service) might be used widely for copyright
infringement.107 It only outlawed services that explicitly condoned or
“induced” such infringement. While an Internet provider could not “tout the
copyright-infringing uses” of its tools, Jonathan Zittrain notes that “the tools
themselves seem to have remained largely, if not entirely, protected by
Sony.”108
The American concept of “fair use” also proved conducive to various
innovations in the digital realm. Fair use allowed a court to provide exceptions
to copyright after considering multiple factors. Take the example of image
search, introduced by Google in 2001. Google’s computers now supplied
images that matched search terms. This required Google to show smaller,
“thumbnail” versions of those images. When Google was challenged, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that these thumbnail versions of the images constituted fair use.109
C. Privacy
U.S. privacy law offers limited constraints for American Internet
entrepreneurs. The vaunted common law privacy torts are each quite narrow in
scope and mostly unavailing to web users concerned about protecting personal
information.110 The torts are not well-suited to the typical privacy concern with
106

Id. at 941.
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Apple Rips While Grokster Burns: How MGM v. Grokster
Benefits Information Technology Companies, FINDLAW (June 29, 2005), http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/
commentary/20050629_sunder.html (“This week’s Supreme Court decision in MGM v. Grokster . . .
substantially reduces the risks faced by information technology companies as they innovate. Steve Jobs must
be breathing a sigh of relief.”). But see Lawrence Lessig, A Rotten Ruling, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2005), http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.09/posts.html?pg=7 (arguing that Grokster created uncertainty and would
impose substantial litigation costs on companies); see also Rob Hof, Larry Lessig: Grokster Decision Will
Chill Innovation, BUSINESS WEEK (June 28, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/
archives/2005/06/larry_lessig_gr.html.
108 Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 291 (2006).
109 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
110 James Whitman concludes that “after a century of legal history, [the right-to-privacy tort] amounts to
little in American practice today.” Whitman, supra note 21, at 1204; see also Neil M. Richards, The Limits of
Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357 (2011) (arguing that tort privacy is poorly suited to the
digital age); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1634 (1999)
(“Unfortunately, various limitations that the common law has established on [the privacy torts] eliminate their
usefulness in responding to violations of privacy in cyberspace. As a result of these restrictions, most data
processing on the Internet is excluded from the scope of the four branches of the privacy tort.” (footnote
omitted)). Consider each of Prosser’s famous torts in turn. The tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires that the
tortfeasor intentionally invade the solitude of another in his or her private affairs, such as through secret
107
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respect to social media, doing little to bar the use of personal information for
marketing or the onward sharing of personal information in unexpected
ways.111 Statutory protections remain quite narrow.112
With the dawn of the World Wide Web, the Clinton Administration
convened a task force to think through privacy rules for these new
communications services. The task force’s 1995 white paper began by
observing that “many people may be reluctant to use the NII [National
Information Infrastructure] if they are afraid that the personal information
transmitted over it can be used in ways that are unexpected or
inappropriate.”113 But instead of a new omnibus privacy statute, the task force
videotaping. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 9 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 30.9 (2012). Courts have been
reluctant to extend the tort to cases involving Google photos of the outside of one’s home, or the disclosure of
information for advertising purposes. See, e.g., Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 279–80 (3d Cir.
2010) (rejecting seclusion claim involving Internet posting of photos of private a residence taken from outside,
where the residents were not visible inside home); Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., No. CV-10-63-BLG-RFC,
2011 WL 1842859, at *2 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011) (“[T]here is no reasonable expectation of privacy when a
plaintiff has been notified that his Internet activity may be forwarded to a third party to target him with
advertisements.”). The tort of publication of embarrassing private facts requires that the facts be held private,
be embarrassing in nature, and be published; it has been successful relatively rarely. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:68 (2d ed. 2011). There may be a narrow set of claims available
for sharing on social networks—but typically against the individual users who forward private material, rather
than the network itself (again as a result of 47 U.S.C. § 230). See Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in
an Internet Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 124, 127, 130 (Saul
Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010). The false light tort requires a person whom intentionally or
recklessly publicizes false information about another person. 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION
§ 10:8 (2d ed. 2011). Invasion of the right of publicity requires the exploitation of a person’s name or likeness,
usually for commercial gain; it might be implicated when Facebook seeks to use one’s photo to promote a
product (though consent may be based on the site’s terms of use). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West
2013); MCCARTHY, supra, at § 3:2; Amy Morganstern, In the Spotlight: Social Network Advertising and the
Right of Publicity, 12 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 181, 183–85 (2008); Daniel Nemet-Nejat, Hey, That’s My
Persona!: Exploring the Right of Publicity for Blogs and Online Social Networks, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113
(2009).
111 William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1105, 1135–36 (“The most significant problem with these limits on disclosure derives from their
circumscribed scope. . . . Against this general background, social marketing appears unlikely to violate most
U.S. privacy laws.”).
112 Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce Law: 2001 Developments, 57 BUS. LAW. 541, 573 (2001)
(“American privacy law . . . [has] a surprisingly narrow scope when applied to the business use of personal
information.”); Ian C. Ballon, Using Trademarks to Drive Traffic to Websites and Other E-Commerce Law
Issues, 590 PLI/Pat 111 (2000) (“U.S. Data privacy law . . . afford[s] substantial protection in very narrow
areas.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Origins and Growth of Information Privacy Law, 828 PLI/Pat 23 (2005);
Schwartz, supra note 110, at 1616 (describing the “[l]ack of [p]rivacy in [c]yberspace” under U.S. law).
113 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE NII: SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED
PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html.
The white paper was posted at gopher://www.ntia.doc.gov/00/policy/privwhitepaper.txt using the nowobsolete Gopher protocol, revealing how fluid and inchoate Internet practices and standards were at the time.
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proposed a voluntary framework whereby companies would notify users of
how they intended to collect and use information, and seek the consent of the
users for such collection and use.114 That model, of course, became the
operative one, allowing websites to set the terms for user privacy, subject only
to public acceptance of those terms rather than regulatory constraints.
Congress did in fact act to protect children’s privacy through the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA). COPPA established
significant protections for younger children online, including requiring parental
consent before websites could collect information from children under thirteen
and requiring adequate security measures for information that was collected.115
This might have posed a challenge to web providers, which would have had to
either segregate how they handled children’s information or refuse children
access. Yet, the statute proved easy to avoid by e-commerce providers, who
simply officially banned those under thirteen from their sites. Millions of
American children responded by fabricating a false birth year to enable them to
access sites such as Facebook116—an expedient available to youth with a
modicum of mathematical ability.117 As long as the sites did not have actual
knowledge that the child was under thirteen, they had no statutory obligation to
treat his or her information with care.118
During the last decade, the absence of strong privacy regulations proved
particularly important because of the business model used by many consumeroriented websites. Web 2.0 providers earn money through advertising or
through selling additional services. If the online provider can tailor
advertisements precisely to the interests of the user, then the advertising will be

114 Id. (“If such private sector action is not forthcoming, however, that framework can and should form
the basis for government-mandated privacy regulations or standards.”).
115 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (requiring website operators “to obtain verifiable parental
consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from children”); id. § 6502(b)(1)(D)
(providing for the promulgation of regulations that “require the operator of such a website or online service to
establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal
information collected from children”).
116 Consumer Reports estimates that nearly 7.5 million children under the age of thirteen use Facebook by
lying about their age. Online Exposure, CONSUMER REP., June 2011, at 29, 30.
117 Tony Bradley, Kids Under 13 Are Already Allowed on Facebook, PCWORLD (May 21, 2011, 6:48
AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/228348/kids_under_13_are_already_allowed_on_facebook.html; Matt
Richtel & Miguel Helft, Where Age Is What You Say It Is, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, at B1.
118 Under the actual knowledge standard, “operators of general audience Web sites are not required to
investigate the ages of their users.” Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,804, 59,806
(Sept. 27, 2011) (to be codified at 16 CFR pt. 312).
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more lucrative.119 In other words, the more the online provider knows about
you, the more it can earn. Rules protecting user privacy can, accordingly,
interfere with a company’s ability to gather information about you, or to
develop a better profile of you by collating information with other online
providers. Thus, the absence of a broad array of effective privacy-enhancing
restraints leaves online services largely free to exploit user information for
maximum profit. As long as the services do not promise more privacy than
they actually deliver, online companies in the United States have a free hand
with information.
The absence of privacy constraints proved especially conducive to Internet
innovation. The success of Silicon Valley enterprises has often been a result
not just of a single initial inspiration, but of successive rounds of serial
innovation within a single firm.120 Much of this innovation results from rapid
experimentation—roll-out of new products, beta-testing, and appraisal. Many
Web 2.0 businesses rely upon a trial-and-error model for innovation. Beta
offerings are presented to be retracted, modified, enhanced, or finalized
depending on the market reception. The plasticity of the software allows quick
responses to market conditions. Because the businesses are innovating new
relationships between users and information, the risk to privacy in this process
of experimentation is especially high. A liberal privacy regime thus proves
conducive to this kind of trial-and-error method for innovation, allowing
companies to base their offerings not on legal constraints but on market
reaction.

119 Robert D. Hof, You Are the Ad, TECH. REV., May/June 2011, at 64, 66 (“[O]ne reason advertisers love
Facebook is that ads can be precisely targeted to specific audiences on the basis of their stated interests,
location, ‘likes,’ and much more.”); Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at
30 (“Almost every major retailer, from grocery chains to investment banks to the U.S. Postal Service, has a
‘predictive analytics’ department devoted to understanding not just consumers’ shopping habits but also their
personal habits, so as to more efficiently market to them.”); Saul Hansell, Microsoft Plans to Sell Search Ads
of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at C1; Michael Zimmer, The Externalities of Search 2.0: The
Emerging Privacy Threats When the Drive for the Perfect Search Engine Meets Web 2.0, 13 FIRST MONDAY
(2008), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/2136/1944 (“[S]earch
engines can charge higher advertising rates when ads are accurately placed before the eyes of users with
relevant needs and interests . . . .”).
120 Google, which occupies the campus of Silicon Graphics, a company that once was a flagship Silicon
Valley enterprise, erected an enormous dinosaur statue on that campus to serve as a reminder of the need to
innovate constantly. Dean Takahashi, Google: Where Food Is Free, IQs Are High, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
July 19, 2007; see also The Internet: How Long Will Google’s Magic Last?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2010, at 81
(quoting Google’s head of product management Jonathan Rosenberg as stating, “[Y]ou only win if you
innovate faster than the players in the rest of the system.” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
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The end result is as follows: while Facebook’s and Google’s innovations
have often drawn public outcries,121 they seldom draw successful lawsuits or
government enforcement actions.122
***
By the end of the twentieth century, laws conducive to the business model
of Web 2.0 were in place. Companies would offer platforms on which users
could provide content, which would in turn attract other users. Companies
would then monetize these large numbers of users by exploiting personal
information about them for marketing. And the law would abide this.
I have shown that, just as nineteenth-century American judges altered the
common law in order to subsidize industrial development, judges and
121 See, e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, “Act Now, Apologize Later”: Will Users “Friend” Facebook’s
Latest Intrusion on Privacy?, EXEC. BRIEFING, June 18, 2010, at 7 (consumer advocates complained that
Facebook’s new “Open Graph” architecture which connects third-party websites to the Facebook Platform so
that users can “like” or recommend content, invades user privacy); Miguel Helft, Google Photos Stir a Debate
Over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at C1 (consumer advocates complained that Google’s new feature on
Google Maps, which shows pictures of street-level views of addresses, invades user privacy); Jon Swartz,
Privacy Advocates Don’t ‘Like’ Facebook’s Ad Plans, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2011, at B1 (consumer advocates
complained that Facebook’s new feature called “Sponsored Stories,” which allows advertisers to pay for users
to be able to “like” their brand or check in at a store and have that action appear on the user’s friends’ pages,
invades user privacy); Jamin Warren & Vauhini Vara, New Facebook Features Have Members in an Uproar,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2006, at B1 (consumer advocates complained that Facebook’s new feature called “News
Feed,” which keeps track of users’ actions and then notifies all of their friends of those developments, invades
user privacy); Jenna Wortham, Facebook Flagged on Privacy Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at B4
(consumer advocates complained that Facebook’s new feature called “Facebook Places,” which allows users to
share their location and find their friends’ locations, invades user privacy); Michael Arrington, Google
Desktop 3.0: Privacy Is Dead(er), TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 8, 2006), http://techcrunch.com/2006/02/08/googledesktop-new-version-tonight/ (consumer advocates complained that Google’s new search feature, which
allows users to search the contents of one computer from another, invades user privacy); Thomas Claburn,
Privacy Groups Decry Google’s Plans for DoubleClick, INFO. WEEK (Apr. 20, 2007, 3:57 PM), http://www.
informationweek.com/news/199200331 (consumer advocates complained that Google’s new feature called
“Web History,” which allows Google to create a complete picture of its users’ online activity by combining
data about Google searches, webpage visits, images, videos, and news stories, invades user privacy); Facebook
Facial Recognition Raises Eyebrows in Germany, EU, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 9, 2011), http://dw.de/p/
11Xg8 (consumer advocates complained that Facebook’s new feature using facial recognition technology to
identify persons in newly added photos, invades user privacy); Facebook Opens Users Shopping Habits, UPI
(Nov. 24, 2007, 6:46 PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2007/11/24/Facebook-opens-users-shoppinghabits/UPI-61161195948019/ (consumer advocates complained that Facebook’s new feature, which makes
users’ online shopping habits public, invades user privacy).
122 There are exceptions, one arising from Google’s introduction of Buzz, and the other from Facebook’s
introduction of Beacon. In re Google Buzz User Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-CV-00672-JW, 2010 WL 6336647
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 08-3845 RS, 2010 WL 2076916 (N.D. Cal. May 24,
2010); In re Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184, 2011 WL 6092532 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011); In re Google Inc., No.
102-3136, 2011 WL 5089551 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011).
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legislators at the turn of the Millennium altered the law to subsidize the
development of Internet companies. Did technologically advanced nations in
Europe and Asia do the same?
II. CONSTRAINTS IN EUROPE AND ASIA
Could Google have been founded in London? According to Google’s Larry
Page and Sergey Brin, as related by Prime Minister David Cameron, the
answer is no.123 This is not due to the lack of brilliant engineers in the United
Kingdom, or sufficient capital in the City of London. Prime Minister Cameron
explains that the Google founders told his government that Google’s service
“depends on taking a snapshot of all the content on the internet at any one time
and they feel our copyright system is not as friendly to this sort of innovation
as it is in the United States.”124 Unlike the law in the United Kingdom, where
Google’s search engine activities might cross the line of copyright
infringement without any promising legal lifeline, U.S. law seems more
flexible. Prime Minister Cameron explained, with apparent envy: “Over there,
they have what are called ‘fair-use’ provisions, which some people believe
gives companies breathing space to create new products and services.”125
But did not Europe offer inducements through the law to web enterprises
similar to those in the United States? And what of Japan and South Korea,
Asian nations that were at the forefront of creating information societies?126 I
123 UK Copyright Laws to Be Reviewed, Announces Cameron, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukpolitics-11695416?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter (last updated Nov. 4, 2010, 1:37 PM).
Cameron accordingly launched a review of British intellectual property law, resulting in the important study
known as the Hargreaves Report. IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GROWTH (2011), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf. There is
controversy as to veracity of this “killer quote.” Andrew Orlowski, Cameron’s ‘Google Review’ Sparked by
Killer Quote That Never Was, REGISTER (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/03/21/cameron_
google_source/.
124 UK Copyright Laws to Be Reviewed, Announces Cameron, supra note 123.
125 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). This is not idle speculation offered in retrospect. Google’s Larry
Page reports that even in the relatively liberal United States, “at the time, people were arguing that making a
copy of a file in a computer’s memory was a violation of copyright. We put the whole web on our servers, so if
that were true, bye-bye search engines.” Levy, supra note 13.
126 See Brian Deutsch, Editorial, See the Digital Future: Korea Today, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar.
28, 2010, at B7 (detailing South Korea’s information-based society); Mark McDonald, For South Korea,
Internet at Blazing Speeds Is Still Not Fast Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, at B3 (noting that South Korea
plans to upgrade its already fast Internet services to provide one gigabit per second Internet speeds to every
home in the country); Jon Brodkin, Two-Thirds of U.S. Internet Users Lack Fast Broadband, NETWORK
WORLD (Jan. 24, 2011, 3:29 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/012411-us-internet-usersbroadband.html (noting that in the United States only 34% of users have Internet connections greater than 5
Mbps, while in Korea and Japan over 60% of Internet connections are greater than 5 Mbps); Internet
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will show that indeed these nations took steps to adjust their laws to the new
cyber-environment, but without the same depth of preference for web
enterprises. Where the United States sought to insulate Internet intermediaries
from liability for the misdeeds of their users, Europe, Japan, and South Korea
created special responsibilities for Internet services. Indeed, what might be
celebrated in the United States could be illegal in Europe, Japan, and South
Korea. Facebook finds the distinction between U.S. law of intermediary
liability and the law elsewhere to be material to its investors. Facebook states
that the risk that it will face claims “is enhanced in certain jurisdictions outside
the United States where our protection from liability for third-party actions
may be unclear and where we may be less protected under local laws than we
are in the United States.”127
Comparative law scholars may observe that many jurisdictions lack the
statutory or punitive damages available under U.S. law, making more legally
demanding obligations abroad less harsh in reality in comparison to the
plaintiff-friendly United States. But when it comes to Internet intermediaries, a
simple injunction alone could require a restructuring of the system that made
the platform economically unfeasible. Only the most foolhardy financiers
would invest in an early stage enterprise that had a business that a tribunal
might declare illegal at any moment. The programmer might even be sent to
jail.
In the sections below, I examine the laws of the European Union, South
Korea, and Japan, demonstrating that when it comes to intermediary liability,
copyright liability, and privacy, the laws of these regions are far less conducive
to Internet enterprise than the United States.
A. Intermediary Liability
1. European Union
The European Union’s intermediary liability law proved less welcoming to
Internet entrepreneurs than U.S. law. Europe takes a unified approach to the
Economy: Wireless Broadband Subscriptions Top Half a Billion, Says OECD, OECD (June 26, 2011), http://
www.oecd.org/newsroom/interneteconomywirelessbroadbandsubscriptionstophalfabillionsaysoecd.htm
(noting that Korea’s broadband penetration doubles the OECD average); Japan Internet Users Spend Most
Time on Blogs Worldwide, COMSCORE (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_
Releases/2011/8/Japan_Internet_Users_Spend_Most_Time_on_Blogs_Worldwide (noting that Japanese
Internet users spend the most time on Internet blogs).
127 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 23 (Feb. 1, 2012).
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issue of intermediary liability, setting the same standard for holding
intermediaries liable regardless of the nature of the underlying offense. There
is logic to this approach, even if it is unlike the American approach, which, as
we have seen in Part I.A above, offers different rules for intermediary liability
for copyright, trademark, and other offenses.128 The European Union’s
Electronic Commerce Directive sets out what are essentially safe harbors from
liability for specified intermediary activities, such as acting as a “mere
conduit,” “caching,” or “hosting” (but not search services). Some countries go
further to include safe harbors for search engines and hyperlink providers.129
Yet, from the perspective of Internet intermediaries, the safe harbors remain
inferior to their American counterparts, providing less protection for copyright,
trademark, defamation, and other claims. I explain here some of the
deficiencies of the European law vis-à-vis U.S. law for Internet
intermediaries.130 I reserve discussion of intermediary liability for copyright
infringement for the following section.
First, the European approach stops far short of the near blanket exclusion
from liability offered by the Communications Decency Act for non–intellectual
property related wrongs.131 Second, the Electronic Commerce Directive largely
adopts the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown approach, but leaves open the
possibility of additional proactive responsibilities on the part of the online
intermediary. Even while disavowing any duty to “monitor,”132 the European
law expressly contemplates the imposition by member states of “duties of
128 The Europeans describe their approach as a “horizontal” one, encompassing secondary liability for all
illicit behavior. Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European Counterparts: A Comparative
Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481, 482 (2009).
129 THIBAULT VERBIEST ET AL., MARKT/2006/09/E, STUDY ON THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_
report_en.pdf.
130 I do not mean to suggest that European law is invariably hostile to Internet intermediaries. For
example, an Italian court recently rejected an attempt to hold Google liable for the automatically generated
suggestions of additional search terms that happened to add offensive words after a person’s name. Giulio
Coraggio, Google NOT Liable for Suggest Search Results, GAMINGTECHLAW (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.
gamingtechlaw.com/2013/04/google-not-liable-for-suggest-search.html.
131 See Eric Pfanner, YouTube Can’t Be Liable on Copyright, Spain Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at
B7 (quoting a London lawyer as saying, “‘The issue of when a host was liable has been getting a bit vague,
and some hosts in Europe have been getting a little bit nervous’”); Bradley L Joslove & Vanessa De
Spiegeleer-Delort, Web 2.0: Aggregator Website Held Liable as Publisher, INT’L L. OFFICE (June 26, 2008),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=4b014ec1-b334-4204-9fbd00e05bf6db95#11 (“[T]he scope of liability of Web 2.0 websites is an unsettled point of law.”).
132 Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal
Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J.
(L 178) 1, 13 [hereinafter Electronic Commerce Directive].
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care” on intermediaries to detect and prevent certain activities.133 Third, the
European directive lacks a statutory notice-and-takedown regime, creating
greater uncertainty among European providers as to whether they have
sufficient knowledge to withdraw liability if they do not delete material.134
Finally, the European approach permitted injunctions against online service
providers more liberally than the American approach, which was more
attentive to the problem of prior restraint.135 The Electronic Commerce
Directive contemplates “orders by courts or administrative authorities
requiring the termination or prevention of any infringement, including the
removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it.”136
The difference between the American and European approaches to
intermediary liability in trademark is evident when we contrast two
authoritative decisions involving the same defendant (eBay) and similar facts
on either side of the Atlantic (storied trademark holders claiming
infringement). Before the European Court of Justice, L’Oréal sought to hold
eBay liable for trademark infringement occurring on eBay’s site.137 EBay
relied on Article 14(1) of the Electronic Commerce Directive to argue that it
was “not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the
service.”138 The court held that this immunity would not be available where the
operator had undertaken “an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge
of, or control over, the data relating to those offers for sale.”139 The Court of
Justice sent the case back to the national court for consideration of whether
eBay “was aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent
economic operator should have realised that the offers for sale in question were
unlawful and, in the event of it being so aware, failed to act expeditiously.”140
Reporting on the decision, the law firm of Latham & Watkins advised its
clients that sites like eBay will “have to engage in a higher degree of self
policing in the future, especially with respect to the offer for sale of well

133

Id. at 6.
Peguera, supra note 128, at 490.
135 Id. at 486.
136 Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 132, at 6.
137 Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011, para. 34 (July 12, 2011), available
at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=107261&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1040212.
138 Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 132, at 13.
139 L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011, para. 116.
140 Id. para. 124.
134
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known or famous brands.”141 They further observed that eBay might have to
modify its system with respect to Europe to allow for easier identification of a
seller: “It would be ironic, but predictable that it could become as difficult to
open an account to sell goods on an auction site without proper identity checks
as it is to open a bank account or instruct a lawyer in the EU.”142 By contrast,
in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals largely
sided with eBay against the trademark holder.143 The U.S. court upheld
summary judgment in favor of eBay on the issue of contributory liability for
trademark infringement.144 It remanded the case on the issue of whether eBay
had itself misled users in its advertising campaign invoking the Tiffany’s
name.145 Commentators rightly hailed the case as a victory for Internet
intermediaries.146
2. South Korea
Where U.S. law seeks to reduce the liability of Internet intermediaries for
statements posted on their sites, South Korean law seeks to make
intermediaries responsible for activities on their sites. In the wake of
demonstrations against American beef exports to Korea organized online, the
South Korean legislature imposed additional obligations on Internet
intermediaries to police online behavior, on the theory that the public was
manipulated by allegedly false claims about the threat of mad cow disease.147 It
also imposed additional obligations on users themselves—the Framework Act
on Telecommunications singles out those using electronic means to spread
information: “A person spreading a false rumor maliciously intending to
damage the public interest by using an electronic machine can be sentenced to
imprisonment for under five years or given a fine under fifty million won.”148

141

Latham & Watkins, Client Alert No. 1226, L’Oréal v. eBay: The Court of Justice of the European
Union Tightens Liability of Online Marketplace Operators 4 (2011), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/
cjeu-tightens-online-marketplace-operators-liability. One case note is headlined, “L’Oréal v. eBay: A Warning
to Online Marketplace Operators.” Joel Smith & Joanna Silver, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 765 (2011).
142 Latham & Watkins, supra note 141, at 4.
143 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 114.
146 Federal Appellate Courts Poised to Deliver Key Cyberlaw Rulings in 2012, 17 ELECTRONIC COM. & L.
REP. 67 (2012) (characterizing decision as “a favorable ruling for online intermediaries”).
147 John M. Leitner, To Post or Not to Post: Korean Criminal Sanctions for Online Expression, 25 TEMP.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 43, 54–55 (2011).
148 Id. at 59 (quoting Jeongitongsingibonbeop [Framework Act on Telecommunications], Act No. 4393,
Aug. 10, 1991, art. 47(1), amended by Act No. 10393, Jul. 23, 2010 (S. Kor.), translated at

CHANDER GALLEYSPROOFS2

674

2/17/2014 9:02 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:639

Furthermore, like many countries, South Korea has a more liberal substantive
standard for defamation (thereby favoring plaintiffs) and permits injunctive
relief for defamation.149
In 2009, the Korean Supreme Court issued a decision holding web portal
sites Naver, Daum, SK Communications, and Yahoo Korea liable for the
defamation of a person named “Kim” occurring on their sites.150 The court
upheld judgments of 10 million won, 7 million won, 8 million won, and 5
million won, respectively, against these services, stating that a web service
“must delete slanderous posts or block searches of the offending posts, even if
not requested to do so by the victim.”151 While these were relatively small
judgments amounting to just thousands of U.S. dollars (approximately $5,700
at the highest152), this might well have caused sites to fear the accumulation of
such fines. The court held that
the obligation of the portal site to remove the [defamatory material]
arose when (a) the content was apparently illegal in the sense of
defamation, and (b) the portal site had actual knowledge of the
illegality of the infringing activity or, awareness of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity was apparent even
153
without the [victim’s] notice . . . to the portal site.

Critics worried that the decision would chill speech, causing websites to delete
user posts to preclude liability.154 The decision seems to confirm Kyu Ho
Youm’s observation that, at least when reputation or honor is at risk, “South
Korea does not protect freedom of expression as a transcendent value.”155

http://elaw.klri.re.kr) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 58 (“Cyber defamation is therefore
punished with stronger penalties than defamation expressed through other channels . . . .”).
149 Kyu Ho Youm, Freedom of Expression and the Law: Rights and Responsibilities in South Korea, 38
STAN. J. INT’L L. 123, 145 (2002) (“The South Korean judiciary has continually rejected any defamation
defense premised upon the U.S. model of ‘actual malice,’ and injunctive relief continues to exist as a prior
restraint against publication.”).
150 Courts Open Up South Korean Web Sites to Liability Charges, HANKYOREH (Apr. 17, 2009, 12:47
PM), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/350253.html.
151 Id.; accord Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Da53812, Apr. 16, 2009 (S. Kor.).
152 For historical exchange rates at the date of the 2009 decision, see http://www.x-rates.com/historical/?
from=EUR&amount=1.00&date=2009-04-16.
153 Memorandum from Sung Gi Hwang, Professor, Hanyang Univ., to author (Mar. 7, 2012) (on file with
author).
154 Id.
155 Kyu Ho Youm, Defamation Law and the Internet in South Korea, 9 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 141, 141
(2004) (citing article 21 of the Constitution of Korea, which provides that “Neither speech nor the press shall
violate the honor or rights of other persons . . .”).
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In February 2012, the Korean Constitutional Court upheld the power of the
Korea Communications Standards Commission under the Act on the
Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and
Information Protection (the Network Act) to order the takedown of “unhealthy
information” on the Internet.156 Importantly, however, the Network Act did not
impose “penalties against non-compliance.”157
3. Japan
Japan may not be a litigious society, but Internet providers seem to have
faced their share of claims. In Japan, running a bulletin board service in 1997
might render you liable for the defamation occurring on that service. That year,
a Tokyo trial court held Internet service provider Nifty Service liable for
failing to delete defamatory messages.158 A heated exchange on a forum titled
“Contemporary Ideas” had resulted in defamatory posts, which the forum’s
manager left up, “apparently believing that continuing the discussion and
trying to engage the parties in a more issue-oriented dialogue would address
the problem.”159 It was not until 2001 that the Tokyo High Court would reverse
the decision.160
That same year, the Diet passed the Law Concerning the Limits of Liability
for Damages of Specified Telecommunications Service Providers, under which
a telecommunications service provider would not be liable for the actions of its
users unless it knew, or where there was “reasonable ground to find that said
relevant service provider could know[,] the violation of the rights of others was
caused
by
the
information
distribution
via
said
specified
telecommunications.”161 Like the European approach, the law applies to all

156

Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2011Hun-Ka13, Feb. 23, 2012, (24-1(A) KCCR, 25) (S. Kor.).
Id.
158 Hisanari Harry Tanaka, Post-Napster: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Systems: Current and Future Issues
on Secondary Liability Under Copyright Laws in the United States and Japan, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37,
67 (2001).
159 Salil K. Mehra, Post a Message and Go to Jail: Criminalizing Internet Libel in Japan and the United
States, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 801 (2007).
160 Id. at 801–02.
161 Tokutei denkitsuushin ekimu teikyousha no songaibaishou sekinin no seigen oyobi hasshinsha jouhou
no kaiji ni kansu ru houritsu [Law Concerning the Limits of Liability for Damages of Specified
Telecommunications Service Providers and the Right to Request Disclosure of Identification Information of
the Senders], Law No. 137 of 2001, art. 3, translated at http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/
Resources/laws/Compensation-Law.pdf (Japan); see also Itsuko Yamaguchi, Beyond De Facto Freedom:
Digital Transformation of Free Speech Theory in Japan, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 109, 114 (2002) (characterizing
standard as “considerable reason” to know of wrongdoing).
157
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intermediary activity, whether involving copyright, trademark, or tort
claims.162 By imposing not only an actual knowledge-and-takedown approach,
but also a more vague “reasonable ground” that the provider “could know,” the
2001 limitation law was a pale shadow of the American § 230 from the
perspective of Internet enterprises.
In 2002, the popular bulletin board service 2Channel was held liable using
the approach of the 2001 law (but not its text because the complained of acts
occurred before the law became effective). The court found that the site’s
“management had been unreasonable in its refusal to remove the offensive
posts when requested.”163 The posts arose on a thread entitled “Corrupt Animal
Hospital.”164 2Channel was fined 4 million yen (approximately $40,000) in
damages.165 Salil Mehra suggests that while this was “not a particularly large
amount, . . . it was a strong enough sign to change the behavior of 2Channel’s
management.”166 The site’s duty to remove the infringing posts was upheld on
appeal.167
B. Copyright
1. European Union
Two directives help frame the inquiry of intermediary liability for
copyright infringement in the European Union. As described above, the
Electronic Commerce Directive of 2000 provided a set of exemptions from
liability for “information society services” that store information at the request
of users, including immunity from copyright infringement claims.168 The 2001
Copyright Directive offered an enumerated and exclusive list of exceptions to
the rights of copyright holders.169
162

Masanobu Katoh, Intellectual Property and the Internet: A Japanese Perspective, 2002 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 333, 340.
163 Mehra, supra note 159, at 802.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 802–03.
167 Id. at 802 n.146 (citing Doubutsu byouin tai 2channeru jiken, 1816 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 52 (Tokyo
High Ct., Dec. 25, 2002)).
168 See supra notes 128–42 and accompanying text.
169 Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L.
167) 10, 12 [hereinafter Copyright Directive]; Hector L MacQueen, ‘Appropriate for the Digital Age’?
Copyright and the Internet: 2. Exceptions and Licensing, in LAW AND THE INTERNET 203, 206 (Lilian Edwards
& Charlotte Waelde eds., 3d ed. 2009).
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The two directives proved inferior to their U.S. counterparts from the
perspective of Internet service providers for the opposite reasons. While the
Electronic Commerce Directive followed the DMCA’s Title II in granting
Internet service providers certain immunities arising from web hosting
activities, it did not specify the exact circumstances that would guarantee
freedom from liability.170 At the same time, the very specificity of the
Copyright Directive undermined its usefulness to web enterprises.171 Rather
than an open-ended doctrine of fair use, European law allowed only specified
exceptions to the exclusive rights of the copyright holder.172 These proved less
flexible in responding to technological developments than American fair use,
which allowed a court to consider each new case individually based on
multiple factors.173 As one British scholar notes, fair use “provide[d] the courts
with some flexibility of response to change in the way copyright works are
disseminated and used, whether arising from new technologies, social behavior
or institutional structures.”174
Even as late as 2008, European lawyers could only advise, “[T]he scope of
liability of Web 2.0 websites is an unsettled point of law.”175 It was only at the
end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 that the European Court of Justice
made clear that Internet intermediaries could not be required to affirmatively
filter their entire networks for copyright infringement. In cases brought by the
Belgian collecting rights society, SABAM, against Internet access provider
Scarlet and online social network Netlog, the court held that enjoining these
companies to filter on behalf of copyright owners uploads by all users would
violate the privacy and speech rights of users, and would be unduly costly and
burdensome to the Internet enterprise.176 While the judgments in SABAM v.
170 Lilian Edwards also notes that the DMCA regime requires that the content provider be notified and
allowed to contest the allegation of illegality, whereas the European regime does not. Lilian Edwards, The Fall
and Rise of Intermediary Liability Online, in LAW AND THE INTERNET, supra note 169, at 47, 76.
171 Martin Senftleben, Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions—The Emerging
EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 521, 522–23 (2010) (summarizing exceptions).
172 Id. at 536 (“This more restrictive approach limits the room to manoeuvre for the courts. The District
Court of Hamburg, for instance, refused to bring thumbnails of pictures displayed by Google’s image search
service under the umbrella of the right of quotation.”).
173 Id. at 527 (“Leaving this discretion to the courts reduces the need for constant amendments to
legislation that may have difficulty in keeping pace with the speed of technological development.”).
174 MacQueen, supra note 169, at 209.
175 Joslove & De Spiegeleer-Delort, supra note 131.
176 Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v.
Netlog NV, at paras. 46–48 (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=119512&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1315853;
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM),
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Netlog and Scarlet v. SABAM clearly support Web 2.0 enterprises, they arrived
nearly a decade after the rise of such companies across the ocean.
2. South Korea
Korean law offers only weak protection for Internet intermediaries accused
of abetting copyright infringement. In 2003, Korea adopted special provisions
to regulate and protect online service providers (OSPs). However, the liability
limitation
operates differently from the safe harbor provisions in the DMCA in
that it does not provide a qualifying OSP with a complete indemnity
against secondary liability: the preventive measures undertaken by
the OSP only serve to limit or reduce its liability, and only provide a
complete indemnity when these measures are ‘technically’ infeasible
177
or ineffective to prevent or stop the infringing activity.

Korean peer-to-peer file trading service Soribada, having been warned by the
courts that it could be held liable for the copyright infringement of its users,
instituted a filtering system that “would deny a user’s request to download a
file for which the copyright holder had specifically requested protection.”178
The Seoul High Court ruled against Soribada nonetheless, suggesting that
Soribada could have designed its system to permit downloads only of music
files for which the copyright owner had provided a license.179 This legal
entitlement creating an opt-in system rather than an opt-out system has
tremendous market importance, as few people (or companies) alter the default
setting.180 This is what Lawrence Lessig characterizes as a “permissions
culture”—ask first, before doing.181 In 2009, Korea introduced the world’s first
graduated response law, a provision widely sought by the content industries.182
2011 E.C.R. I-11959 paras. 48, 52 (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=131
7843.
177 Daniel Seng, Comparative Analysis of the National Approaches to the Liability of Internet
Intermediaries, at para. 104, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_
internet_intermediaries.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2014) (preliminary version World Intellectual Property
Organization study).
178 Id. at para. 102.
179 Id. (citing Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2006La1535, Oct. 10, 2007 (S. Kor.)).
180 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 85–86 (2008).
181 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, at xiv (2004).
182 See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1376–77 (2010) (noting that
South Korea has adopted a graduated response system).
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Under the law, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism can order a
website hosting infringing material to remove that material, and to disable
accounts of repeat offenders.183 Furthermore, the government can shut down
the website itself if it fails repeatedly to remove material, after warning.184
Some suggested that graduated response could be used to silence political
criticism “such as Agora, a discussion board operated by Daum
(www.daum.net), which was a seedbed for anti-government criticism during
the controversy over the beef issue.”185
3. Japan
In Japan, developing a peer-to-peer file sharing service in the last decade
might get you arrested. In 2002, Isamu Kaneko, a researcher at the University
of Tokyo’s School of Information and Science Technology, began distributing
a peer-to-peer file-sharing program he wrote called “Winny.”186 In May 2004,
he was arrested for copyright infringement because he continued to distribute
his program, despite being aware that some used it to infringe copyrights.187
After his arrest, Kaneko, an “idol” among programmers who had taught a
series of lectures to nurture “superprogrammers,” resigned from his University
position.188 In December 2006, the Kyoto District Court found him guilty,
decrying his “selfish and irresponsible attitude” and concluding that he knew
that Winny “was being used to violate the law and allowed users to do so.”189
Yet, the judge conceded that “Kaneko did not specifically intend to cause
copyright violations on the Internet.”190 He was fined 1.5 million yen for the
infringement.191 The Japanese Supreme Court would ultimately clear him of all
charges, but not until December 2011.192
Japan’s 2001 law limiting liability for Internet service companies in certain
circumstances was far less friendly to such companies than the DMCA. Rather
than the relatively clear safe harbors of the DMCA, Japan’s law removed any
183 See Kim Tong-hyung, Upload a Song, Lose Your Internet Connection, KOR. TIMES (May 4, 2009, 5:14
PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2010/05/133_42594.html.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 File-Sharing Author Arrested, DAILY YOMIURI, May 11, 2004, at 2.
187 Id.
188 Winny Inventor Convicted, DAILY YOMIURI, Dec. 14, 2006, at 1.
189 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
190 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
191 Id.
192 Editorial, Absurd Arrest Rectified, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/
2011/12/26/editorials/absurd-arrest-rectified/#.UlVbMGSSxJs.
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protections if the provider knew or should have known of infringement
occurring through its service, a far more uncertain standard, given the
likelihood that some users will infringe on any Web 2.0 service.193
While legal clarity can sometimes help Internet companies, it can also
undermine them. Like Europe, Japan enumerates specific exceptions to the
rights of copyright holders, rather than the open-ended approach of American
fair use law. This means that unless the particular action is authorized by an
enumerated exception, it violates copyright. The lack of an explicit exception
even made illegal the act of uploading a photo of artwork on an auction site in
connection with its sale.194 Because this act was not for news reporting,
criticism, or research (the enumerated exceptions), it was declared illegal.195 In
2009, the Diet finally amended the Copyright Act to allow the use of
thumbnails of a copyrighted work for an online auction.196 Acts that Americans
take for granted—such as the posting on a blog of a souvenir picture of
Disneyland—can also potentially run afoul of Japanese copyright law, even
after the 2009 amendment.197 The enumeration approach has led many to
worry that new uses, especially ones made possible by new technologies,
might not qualify for the exceptions.198 As one Japanese academic notes, “[I]f
copyright exceptions are interpreted strictly by courts, most daily use might be
copyright infringements.”199 Japanese legal scholar Tatsuhiro Ueno portrays
the end result of these rules: observing the existence of an American research
website collecting cases of musical infringement stretching back over one
hundred years, Ueno notes, “[I]f the same exact website were established in
Japan, it would constitute an infringement of the right of public
transmission.”200 Another Japanese intellectual property scholar concludes,
“Without a proper balance [between copyright protection and innovation], any
193

See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
Yeyoung Chang, Debates on Introduction of “Fair Use” to the Copyright Act of Japan and Korea—
Do Japan and Korea Need Fair Use? 7 (Comparative IP Academic Workshop, Working Paper No. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/WWIP/Papers/2009/Debates on Introduction of Fair use to
the Copyright Act of Japan and Korea - Do Japan and Korea need Fair use.pdf.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Tatsuhiro Ueno, Rethinking the Provisions on Limitations of Rights in the Japanese Copyright Act—
Toward a Japanese-Style “Fair Use” Clause, 34 A.I.P.P.I. 159, 179 (2009); Chang, supra note 194, at 7.
198 Chang, supra note 194, at 5–6 (noting criticism that the enumeration list approach makes it “hard to
cover the all new types of use,” but preferring a “[b]alancing approach based on human rights” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
199 Id. at 7; see also Ueno, supra note 197, at 161 (noting that exception “provisions have been strictly
(narrowly) interpreted”).
200 Ueno, supra note 197, at 181.
194
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company that wants to introduce new technology services may be too cautious
to start its business.”201
Prime Minister Cameron’s concern about whether English law would have
permitted Google might have also held true for Japan until 2010. Because of
the lack of a broad fair use provision in Japan, the copying required for a
search engine to function needed an express exemption from the copyright
holder’s rights. Lacking such an express exemption, search engines faced the
prospect of being illegal, until a 2009 amendment permitted search engines to
copy copyrighted works for the purpose of displaying search results.202 Before
this amendment went into effect in 2010, Google’s Fumi Yamazaki asked,
“Did you know that running a search engine index server in Japan is
illegal . . . ?”203 Yamazaki reports that before the amendment went into effect,
“search engines in Japan such as Google and Yahoo inevitably kept their
servers outside of Japan.”204
This was consistent with the damning advice of a programming professor
in the wake of the Winny conviction. Shinji Yamane, a researcher at the
International University of Japan’s Center for Global Communications
reported that after Kaneko’s conviction, his own students were “concerned
about their products potentially violating the law.”205 Yamane continued, “I tell
them to release the software overseas.”206

201 Naoya Isoda, Copyright Infringement Liability of Placeshifting Services in the United States and
Japan, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 149, 152 (2011).
202 Yoshiyuki Tamura, Law Professor and Dir. of Research, Inst. for Info. Law & Policy, Hokkaido Univ.,
Presentation at the Renmin University International Forum on the Centennial of Chinese Copyright
Legislation: Rethinking Copyright Institution for the Digital Age: Japanese Perspective 7 (Oct. 14, 2010),
available at http://www.ipr2.org/storage/Tamura-EN959.pdf (noting that under the Copyright Law
Amendment Act of 2009, “Works may be reproduced where a search site retrieves data from other websites
and displays a result of retrieval upon a user’s request”); see also Teruo Doi, Availability of the “Fair Use”
Defense Under the Copyright Act of Japan: Legislative and Case Law Developments for Better Adapting It to
the Digital/Network Environment, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 631, 632 (2010) (describing the 2009
amendments); Net-Savvy Copyright Bill Worthy of Quick Passage, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Apr. 13, 2009 (“The bill
would make it possible for search services to collect and analyze information without the permission of
copyright holders.”).
203 Fumi Yamazaki, Updated: Copyright Law Amendment, WHAT’S HAPPENING IN JAPAN RIGHT NOW?
(June 14, 2009, 8:40 PM), http://fumijp.blogspot.com/2009/06/copyright-law-amendment.html.
204 Id.
205 Winny Ruling Shocks Industry, DAILY YOMIURI, Dec. 15, 2006, at 3.
206 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
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This seems to have been the route followed by the popular Internet bulletin
board, 2Channel, founded by Hiroyuki Nishimura in 1999.207 In 2004, The
New York Times reported that Nishimura paid $20,000 a month to a company
in Palo Alto to host the Japanese language service.208 While some might
suggest that this simple sleight of hand might successfully avoid all the
restraints I described earlier, that may not be so clear. In 2009, Nishimura sold
the site to a Singaporean company, despite the fact that, according to Wired,
the site generated 500 million page views per month.209 His foreign webhost
had not prevented a “sea of litigation” against him and judgments amounting to
millions of dollars.210 The legal risk involved in the operation may well have
made it difficult for him to raise capital to, for example, take the site global.
C. Privacy
1. European Union
As James Whitman describes, European privacy law is a world away from
the American laissez-faire approach.211 In October 1995, at the same time that
the Clinton Administration was declaring its support for industry selfregulation, the European Union was announcing its elaborate and demanding
Data Protection Directive.212 The 1995 Directive requires “unambiguous”
consent before the automated processing of personal information.213 It further
requires that information that is gathered must be “collected for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way
incompatible with those purposes.”214 Rather than a sectoral approach

207

Norimitsu Onishi, Japanese Find a Forum to Vent Most-Secret Feelings, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2004, at

N3.
208

Id.
Lisa Katayama, Flame Warrior, WIRED, June 2008, at 110; Alex Martin, 2channel Founder Ponders
Next Step After Forum’s Sale, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 24, 2009), http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn2009
0124a1.html.
210 Martin, supra note 209.
211 See Whitman, supra note 21, at 1155–57.
212 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (discussing the Clinton Administration white paper on
privacy). Both the American white paper and the European Directive are dated October 1995.
213 Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. For the implementing legislation within the
European Union member states, see Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
data-protection/law/status-implementation/index_en.htm (last updated July 16, 2013).
214 Data Protection Directive, supra note 213, at 40.
209
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imposing obligations on certain health care and financial providers, European
law offers omnibus protections covering all personal information. Certain
categories of information processing—political, health, or sex-related
information—are regulated even more tightly.215 The Directive requires that
data controllers secure personal data against accidental or unauthorized
disclosure.216 This Directive posed significant constraints on Web 2.0
enterprises, limiting their information-gathering and -sharing functions.217
A 2002 directive, the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive
(the E-Privacy Directive), added even more constraints.218 The E-Privacy
Directive included a broad requirement to ensure the confidentiality of
communications, and banned the “surveillance of communications . . . without
the consent of the user[].”219 The Directive required “clear and comprehensive
information” before a company could store information such as cookies (used
to track web behavior), and required the site to offer the ability to opt out of
cookies.220 Such rules complicated the behavioral monitoring necessary for
targeted advertising. They made it difficult to garner the datasets about an
individual that might enable companies to know better how to cater to his or
her interests (and means). Over the years, the E-Privacy Directive was
interpreted and amended in ways that largely confirmed its constraints on
tracking and information gathering, thus disabling sophisticated marketing
capabilities.221
The astonishing reach of the Data Protection Directive can be seen in the
case known as Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist.222 Lindqvist was
215

See, e.g., id.
Id. at 43.
217 See, e.g., id. (requiring member states to implement technical and operational measures to protect the
security of personal data).
218 Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J.
(L 201) 37.
219 Id. at 43.
220 Id. at 44.
221 See Directive 2009/136, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009
Amending Directive 2002/22 on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Communications
Networks and Services, Directive 2002/58 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector and Regulation No. 2006/2004 on Cooperation Between
National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11;
see also Marie-Andrée Weiss, Towards Mandatory Data Breach Notification Laws in the European Union, J.
INTERNET L., June 2011, at 24, 24 (“The 2009 Directive has been nicknamed the ‘Cookie Directive,’ as it
requires end-user consent to the storing of cookies on their computers.”).
222 Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971.
216
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a Swedish parishioner who published a website to assist fellow churchgoers in
their confirmation process.223 She published personal information about her
fellow parishioners on this site without their consent, including the fact that
one person had “injured her foot.”224 For this, she was criminally prosecuted
under the Swedish law implementing the Data Protection Directive.225 The
European Court of Justice held that Lindqvist had indeed violated European
privacy law because she had processed personal information about others (by
making it available on the web), without their permission.226 What would have
been readily protected under the First Amendment in the United States was
subject to criminal prosecution in Europe.
In another notorious case, Google executives were convicted in Italy of
crimes against privacy for not taking down rapidly enough a video ridiculing a
disabled child.227 The executives were convicted specifically of the crime of
“illicit treatment of personal data” (trattamento illecito dei dati) because “with
the purpose of obtaining a gain they participated in the processing of the video
[by distributing it through YouTube] containing health data of the disabled
teenager without his consent.”228 The February 2010 convictions were
overturned on appeal in December 2012,229 but the convictions demonstrated
the ambiguities of a law that might sentence Internet executives for not
policing their services sufficiently. This case again demonstrates what James
Whitman describes as the “‘radically different’” laws on both sides of the
Atlantic on the liability of Internet providers for privacy offenses.230

223

Id. at I-12981.
Id. at I-13014.
225 Id. at I-12981.
226 Jacqueline Lipton suggests that Lindqvist’s case is not instructive for information disclosed via social
networks because those networks generally make information available only to one’s “friends,” rather than the
public at large. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 484 (2010) (“[T]he
holding was limited to text-based information disclosed to the world at large on a publicly available website.”).
However, the charge against Lindqvist was not that she disclosed information to the public, but rather that she
processed information about others without their permission. See Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-13003.
Furthermore, Facebook’s and Google’s social networks give a user the option to share not only with her
friends, but also the general public.
227 See Giovanni Sartor & Mario Viola de Azevedo Cunha, The Italian Google-Case: Privacy, Freedom
of Speech and Responsibility of Providers for User-Generated Contents, 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 356, 356
(2010).
228 Id. at 361–62.
229 Eric J. Lyman, Italian Court Overturns 2010 Convictions of Google Executives over Bullying Video,
18 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 84, 84 (2013).
230 Whitman, supra note 21, at 1200.
224
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2. South Korea
South Korean law offers substantial omnibus protections for privacy
online. South Korea’s 2001 Network Act was modeled in part on the OECD
Guidelines, as well as the German Online Service Data Protection Act
(Teledienstedatenschutzgesetz) of 1997, which was itself passed to implement
the 1995 European Data Protection Directive.231 The Network Act requires
data processors to “obtain as little amount of personal data as required for the
provision of the services,” obtain consent of the data subject for data
processing, and safeguard security of the data.232 Failure to comply can result
in fines, imprisonment, or both.233 In 2011, Korea passed an additional data
protection law, the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA), which, among
other things, established a right to file class actions in court over alleged
violations of the law.234 The new law requires privacy assessments by large
database developers.235 Wherever there is an overlap between PIPA and other
privacy protections, the stronger provisions will apply.236
Korean privacy law is not a paper tiger. The law establishes a standing
committee to mediate personal information disputes, with the power to award
enforceable awards once mediation is selected.237 The committee awards
compensatory damages “in almost all cases” where a privacy breach is found,
with damages typically ranging from U.S. $100 to U.S. $10,000.238 The
Korean authorities receive more than 17,000 complaints per year.239

231 See Chan-Mo Chung, Experiments with Cyberlaws in Korea, INTERNET SOC’Y, http://www.isoc.org/
inet2000/cdproceedings/8c/8c_3.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
232 See id.
233 DLA PIPER, DATA PROTECTION LAWS OF THE WORLD 305 (2013), available at http://www.dlapiper.
com/files/Uploads/Documents/IPT_Data_Protection_Handbook_2013.pdf. By contrast, even the United States
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act does not include criminal sanctions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506
(2012).
234 Hunton & Williams LLP, South Korea Enacts Comprehensive Privacy Law, PRIVACY & INFO.
SECURITY L. BLOG (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2011/04/articles/south-korea-enactscomprehensive-privacy-law/; see also Kwang Hyun Ryoo & Ji Yeon Park, Bae, Kim & Lee LLC, Further
Korean Data Privacy Rules Announced, LEGAL UPDATE: KOREA, May 31, 2011, at 1, 1, available at http://
www.bkl.co.kr/kor/_common/filedownload.asp?file=doc\bkl-koreanlawupdate-20110531.pdf.
235 See Ryoo & Park, supra note 234, at 1, 3.
236 BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, COUNTRY REPORT: KOREA 1 (2012), available at http://portal.bsa.
org/cloudscorecard2012/assets/pdfs/country_reports/Country_Report_Korea.pdf.
237 Id.
238 Graham Greenleaf, Major Changes in Asia Pacific Data Privacy Laws: 2011 Survey, at 3 (Univ. of
N.S.W. Faculty of Law Research Series, Paper No. 3, 2012), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1335&context=unswwps-flrps12.
239 Id.
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3. Japan
Japan enacted an omnibus privacy statute, the Personal Information
Protection Act, in 2003.240 While explicit consent does not seem to be required
before the collection of personal information, businesses cannot obtain
personal information from individuals by “fraudulent or other unfair
means.”241 The data collector must provide notice of the intended uses of the
data.242 If plans change for the use of the information, “the change must not
exceed the scope ‘reasonably recognized as having an appropriate connection
with the original [p]urpose of [u]se.’”243 Businesses cannot share personal
information with third parties without the consent of the data subject.244
Businesses also have security obligations with respect to the personal data.245
Japan does not provide a private cause of action for data privacy violations,246
and even though consumer centers and the government receive over 12,000
complaints per year, the enforcement record remains unclear.247
D. Application: Social Networks
The legal regime has influence in ways that are often difficult to perceive.
Consider Facebook’s signal feature—its “News Feed,” which automatically
supplies to your own Facebook page all the activity of your Facebook
“friends.” Introduced in 2006, the feature met loud protests. Some mocked

240 Asim Z. Haque & Mathiew H. Le, Recent Development, Privacy Year in Review: Canada’s Personal
Information and Protection and Electronic Documents Act and Japan’s Personal Information Protection Act,
1 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 477, 494 (2005).
241 Summary and Discussion of the New Act, PRIVACY & AM. BUS., Nov. 2003, at 17, 18 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
242 Haque & Le, supra note 240, at 501 (citing Personal Information Protection Act, ch. 4, subch. 1,
art. 18).
243 Id. at 500 (alterations in original) (citing Personal Information Protection Act, ch. 4, subch. 1, art. 15).
244 Id. at 502 (citing Personal Information Protection Act, ch. 4, subch. 1, art. 23); see also Rudy Guyon,
Outline of Privacy Laws in Japan, Australia, APEC and Selected Other Asian Countries (from a Company
Perspective), 902 PLI/Pat 481, 491 (2007) (“Specific consent must be obtained before transfer of personal
information to a third party . . . . To obtain specific consent, in advance the data gatherer must notify the
person providing the personal data of . . . [t]he specific items that will be provided to the third party . . . .”).
245 See Guyon, supra note 244, at 489.
246 Graham Greenleaf, Country Studies: B.5–Japan, in EUR. COMM’N DIRECTORATE-GENERAL JUSTICE,
FREEDOM & SEC., COMPARATIVE STUDY ON DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NEW PRIVACY CHALLENGES, IN
PARTICULAR IN THE LIGHT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 23 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_country_report_B5_japan.pdf.
247 Id. at 26; see also Greenleaf, supra note 238, at 6. Greenleaf writes that, even with limited evidence of
enforcement, “it is possible that Japan’s legislation is observed by many companies and agencies, simply
because it is the law.” Greenleaf, supra note 238, at 6.
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Facebook as “Stalkerbook,” and some called for a “cyber-revolt.”248 A student
at the University of Illinois, Kiyoshi Martinez, summarized the concern:
“Every change I make becomes broadcasted with a bullhorn to everyone—all
my friends.”249 Even though the information broadcast through the news feed
was technically available to everyone who took the trouble to check out each
of their friend’s homepages, this changed the valence of activity on Facebook.
Individuals who had posted to their webpage, expecting that they were sharing
information only with those who would take the trouble to come visit their site,
now found that their information was being shared among their friends without
their friends’ having to leave their own homepages. Many people belonged to
school networks, so that any relationship changes were broadcast essentially to
the entire student body. Responding to the protests, Facebook offered users the
ability to limit the feature somewhat.250
Could Facebook have introduced such a feature if it had been a European
company? The feature did not pose any real technological hurdle (though
Facebook now owns a patent for it251). The idea and the willingness to
implement it were all that were necessary. The European Data Protection
Directive requires an individual’s “unambiguous” consent before any
automated processing of personal information about that person.252 Facebook
certainly did not ask its users to opt into this feature—it automatically included
all of its users in broadcasting their information to their network, unless they
opted out of such disclosures. The public protest in the United States at
Facebook’s chutzpah (as it was then decried, now what many might consider
prescience) was not followed by governmental action. Could a European social
network have adopted such an innovation?253 Could Korea’s Cyworld social
network, launched in 1999, have introduced such a feature without meeting the
ire of the Korean authorities? Could Japan’s Mixi social network, launched at
the same time as Facebook in February 2004, have tested the law with such a
move?
248

Lauren K. Meade, A Little Too in Their Face?, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 5, 2006, at 1.
Janet Kornblum, Facebook Alters Info Feature That Angered Users, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2006, at 4B
(internal quotation marks omitted).
250 Warren St. John, When Information Becomes T.M.I., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at 8.
251 See U.S. Patent No. 7,669,123 (filed Aug. 11, 2006) (issued Feb. 23, 2010).
252 Data Protection Directive, supra note 213, at 40.
253 Consider the letter sent by officials representing twenty-four European states to Google in October
2012 complaining that Google’s “[p]rivacy policy suggests the absence of any limit concerning the scope of
the [data] collection and the potential uses of the personal data.” Letter from Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party
to Larry Page, Google, (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/press/Letter_from_the_
Article_29_Working_Party_to_Google_in_relation_to_its_new_privacy_policy.pdf.
249
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An exception to my general claim (also involving Facebook) demonstrates
the rule. When Netflix, the world’s most popular Internet movie service, rolled
out its integration with Facebook, the world’s most popular social network, it
offered the service in forty-four of the forty-five countries in which it
operated.254 The missing country? The United States.255 An obscure, narrow
privacy statute proved what Netflix described as an insurmountable block to
information sharing between Netflix and Facebook. In 1988, in the wake of the
revelations of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s video rental records,
Congress made it illegal for a video rental service to reveal video rental records
of any customer without that customer’s contemporaneous permission.256 This
Video Privacy Protection Act had an unexpected consequence some two
decades later—effectively barring Netflix from sharing the video rental records
of one Facebook user with that person’s Facebook network unless the first user
consented to the sharing for each video (rather than through a blanket prior
consent). Congress provided for a private cause of action, with minimum
statutory damages of $2,500 for each violation.257 For a company like Netflix,
with some twenty million American subscribers,258 the fines for ignoring the
statute could conceivably entail a judgment in excess of its market
capitalization.259 A relatively obscure and narrow privacy statute had foiled the
social networking plans of two enormous multinational corporations (at least
until they lobbied to have the law changed260). Imagine the consequences of far
broader and more demanding privacy laws outside the United States.
***

254 Ronny Kerr, Spotify, Netflix Snuggle Up to the New Facebook, VATORNEWS (Sep. 22, 2011),
http://vator.tv/news/2011-09-22-spotify-netflix-snuggle-up-to-the-new-facebook.
255 Id. Whether European data privacy rules would foil Facebook–Netflix integration has yet to be tested
because Netflix is not currently available in most European countries. See Catherine Shu, Netflix Will Launch
in the Netherlands Later This Year as Its International Expansion Slows, TECHCRUNCH (June 18, 2013),
http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/18/netflix-will-launch-in-the-netherlands-later-this-year-as-its-internationalexpansion-slows/ (explaining that the Netherlands will be Netflix’s seventh European country).
256 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2006) (permitting disclosure of video rental records “with the informed,
written consent of the consumer given at the time the disclosure is sought”).
257 Id. § 2710(c). The statute authorizes courts to impose punitive damages and attorneys’ fees in addition
to statutory damages.
258 Netflix, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Feb. 10, 2012).
259 Netflix, Inc. Stock Chart, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=NFLX (last visited Jan. 10,
2014) (reporting daily dynamic stock information for Netflix, specifically including a market capitalization of
$19.68 billion as of the close of business on Jan. 10, 2014).
260 See Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, § 2, 125 Stat. 2414
(2013) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)) (permitting prior consent for video sharing for a period of up to two
years).
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But what of Germany’s StudiVZ, Japan’s Mixi, Spain’s Tuenty, and South
Korea’s Daum and Naver? Should not these services be illegal as well? How
can we explain the emergence and persistence of indigenous European Web
2.0 enterprises if the local law is so adverse to their existence? In part, these
companies can shelter under the operations of their American counterparts, at
least now that the American firms are well established. If local authorities
challenge them, those authorities may be implicitly threatening the American
colossi. Legal risks may well make it more difficult for them to raise capital to
scale up.261 Perhaps even more importantly, the law hampers their ability to
innovate, to offer new services (e.g., a map of their world, a timeline of their
life, a tracking of their movements, a seamless link between the individual and
corporations with whom she relates). One might note that Facebook and
Google have come to increasingly dominate in both Germany and Spain,
despite what one might suppose to be the local advantages of StudiVZ and
Tuenty.262
III. AVOIDING “FROM WOW TO YUCK”
Innovation scholar Vicki Colvin warns about a “wow” to “yuck” trajectory
for nanotechnology.263 Speaking before Congress in 2003, she worried that the
early enthusiasm for this new technology would be replaced by popular
revulsion in the face of its unintended consequences.264 Colvin advised, “The
good news is that it is not too late to ensure that nanotechnology develops
responsibly and with strong public support.”265

261 See Maija Palmer, A Future Alongside Facebook, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at 10. The Financial
Times offered backhanded support for local alternatives to the American services, observing that “they can be
viable little businesses.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
262 See Daten und Fakten, STUDIVZ, http://www.studivz.net/l/about_us/1/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014)
(providing German language services and programs to 16 million users). StudiVZ lost one million users from
2010 to 2011. See id. (last updated Mar. 3, 2011), http://web.archive.org/web/20110303060121/http://www.
studivz.net/l/about_us/1 (accessed by searching for the website in the Internet Archive) (noting StudiVZ
served seventeen million users in 2010); see also FITTKAU & MAAß CONSULTING, W3B REPORT ON FACEBOOK
GOOGLE+ & CO.: NUTZER, NUTZUNG, POTENTIALE 8 (2011), available at http://www.lebensmittelzeitung.net/
studien/pdfs/380_.pdf (reporting that in mid-2011, Facebook had 44.3% of the German market, with the
highest local competitor attaining only 9.5%); Palmer, supra note 261 (noting that French social network
Skyrock “has lost about a third of its audience” to Facebook).
263 Hearings, supra note 23, at 49 (statement of Vicki L. Colvin, Executive Director, Center for Biological
and Environmental Nanotechnology).
264 Id.
265 Id.
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Silicon Valley too has captivated the world, becoming the paragon of a
knowledge economy. Its enterprises have utilized the Internet and the World
Wide Web to develop history’s most powerful and popular platforms for
instant communications. These firms improve the productivity of workers and
disseminate knowledge across the world. Individuals increasingly learn
through tutorials posted on YouTube. Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter played
key roles in mobilizing support for those seeking to depose Arab tyrants by
allowing citizens to express their grievances, inform each other, and organize
together.266
At the same time, by becoming the global engines for communication,
Silicon Valley enterprises have also become hosts for insults, lies, and hate
speech. The enterprises know more about us than other companies, or even
most governments, have ever known, holding dossiers that might have
impressed the Stasi.267 Today, companies know what you read,268 what you
search for, who your friends are, what you buy or browse, your politics, and
your sexual orientation.269 Armed with this information, American Internet
companies have helped to rat out dissidents in authoritarian states.270 In the
hands of an authoritarian (or even democratic271) government, “does the
Internet render an entire population prisoner to a national Panopticon?”272 An
example from the brick-and-mortar world hints at the concern: the American
retail store Target figured out a teenager was pregnant before her father did,
likely based on monitoring of in-store purchases.273 This clearly falls on the
“yuck” side of customer profiling.
The legal historian Morton Horwitz decried what he believed to be the
subsidies that the law implicitly offered to industrialists in the nineteenth
266 See generally Anupam Chander, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1505 (2012) (discussing
the role of the Internet in the Arab revolutions).
267 Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1825 (2012) (describing Facebook’s dossier
on one Austrian student as some 1,200 pages long); Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 14 (2011) (describing the tactics of the Stasi).
268 See Alexandra Alter, Your E-Book Is Reading You, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2012, at D1.
269 Heather Kelly, Facebook ‘Likes’ Can Reveal Your Secrets, Study Finds, CNN TECH (Mar. 11, 2013,
12:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/tech/social-media/facebook-likes-study/index.html.
270 See Chander, supra note 266.
271 Revelations about domestic spying even in the United States during the course of this writing have
proved disturbing. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, NSA Repeatedly Broke Privacy Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 16,
2013, at A1 (detailing oversteps by government agencies in regard to privacy controls since 2008).
272 Chander, Googling Freedom, supra note 267, at 10.
273 Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES
(Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-ateen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/.
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century: “forced subsidies to growth coerced from the victims of the process,”
he charged.274 Horwitz argued that the “tendency of subsidy through legal
change during [the antebellum years] was dramatically to throw the burden of
economic development on the weakest and least active elements in the
population.”275
The subsidies offered to Silicon Valley enterprises through legal privileges
were not without their costs. Return to the plight of actress Christianne
Carafano, subjected to a “cruel and sadistic identity theft.”276 A malicious
person using a computer in Berlin posted a false dating profile of her,
providing her actual address.277 Once the website learned of the wrongdoing, it
hid the profile and later deleted it.278 When she sued Metrosplash for
permitting such a profile in the first place, her case was thrown out, barred by
§ 230.279 Even with a notice-and-takedown regime, as preferred by some
critics, Carafano would not have had a case, given that Metrosplash seems to
have promptly corrected the falsehood. But § 230 would likely have
immunized Metrosplash even if it had left the material up because it did not
have a hand in producing it. And chasing the wrongdoer utilizing a computer
in Berlin might have proven difficult.
The costs of the privileges provided to Silicon Valley were widely
dispersed. The victims included individuals whose privacy was jeopardized
and others who were defamed through web services. In Mancur Olson’s terms,
they (or perhaps we) are a classic “latent group,” dispersed and unorganized,
and thus at risk of losing in the political process.280 Yet, the political economy
is not entirely so clear. A large, well-organized, and economically powerful
constituency—Hollywood—did in fact lobby against Silicon Valley’s
exemptions. This resulted in a stricter intermediary liability regime for
copyright than for tort.281 The political economy analysis is complicated
further by the fact that the results are not consistent across jurisdictions. The

274

HORWITZ, supra note 17, at xvi.
Id. at 101.
276 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003); see supra notes 64–68 and
accompanying text.
277 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121.
278 Id. at 1122.
279 Id. (noting the dispositive question on appeal was whether the suit was properly barred by § 230).
280 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 50
(1965) (internal quotation marks omitted).
281 The DMCA’s Title II regulated intermediary liability in copyright, the common law regulated
intermediary liability in trademark, and § 230 provided immunity for torts.
275
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intermediary liability rules in Europe, South Korea, and Japan proved quite
different, as we have seen.
A focus on costs alone would be woefully incomplete. While the costs of
Silicon Valley’s privileges were widely dispersed, it is important to note that
so were their benefits. Most of us have gained from our greater access to
knowledge, and from our ability to speak directly to the world and to hear
directly from it, and to engage and enlarge our social networks. Imposing strict
obligations on intermediaries might well come at the price of both speech and
innovation.
Are there ways to minimize the negative consequences of a no-liability,
laissez-faire regime for Internet firms yet preserve the “breathing space” that
such firms clearly need to innovate?282 Some have suggested that the noticeand-takedown regime employed for copyright should be extended to
defamation.283 Some law and economics scholars (including Nobel economics
laureates Kenneth Arrow and Gary Becker) have suggested that Internet
intermediaries can deter copyright infringement “at low cost and without any
significant interference with non-infringing uses.”284 Others would suggest that
the law tilts too strongly in favor of copyright holders: Pam Samuelson has
argued that the DMCA’s Title I favored the copyright industries, harming the
information technology industries in the process.285 Many have bemoaned the
lack of substantial privacy protections in the United States, arguing that we
should “renegotiat[e] [the] Faustian bargain” struck between web users and
websites.286 These are all controversial suggestions, some of which might even
pose an existential threat to a free Internet (here I mean free, as in beer).
Should we see these legal privileges as a way to kick-start an infant
industry (and thus temporary), or as a response to the fundamentally new
282

See supra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting British Prime Minister David Cameron).
See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 993,
1023; Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335 (2005); cf.
Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293
(2011).
284 Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth J. Arrow et al. in Support of Petitioners at 9, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480).
285 Samuelson, supra note 95, at 523–24 (“One would have thought, given the Framework’s principles
and the Administration’s enthusiasm for the strong economic performance of the information technology
sector, that the Administration would have taken a more balanced position on these issues.”); accord Anupam
Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205 (2006).
286 Zimmer, supra note 119; see also Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1287–94 (1998) (proposing a draft privacy statute).
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nature of such enterprises (and thus permanent)? Was a modification to tort
law the best way to subsidize the new industry of Internet services?
Economists often prefer subsidization through direct transfers, rather than the
relatively opaque adjustment of the law.287 But given the fact that liability
exposure might have shuttered the business entirely, only very large direct
transfers might have served to counter the legal risks entailed in continuing.288
Indeed, bringing on new users might have generally proven uneconomical
because statutory damages were far in excess of actual damages.
It is possible that the promise of strong privacy-protective legal framework
might be attractive to consumers. Viviane Reding, the EU Commissioner
responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, justified a
stronger, unified European privacy regime, in terms starkly resounding in
regulatory competition: “The new rules . . . give EU companies an advantage
in global competition. . . . [T]hey will be able to assure their customers that
valuable personal data will be treated with the necessary care and diligence.
Trust . . . will be a key asset for service providers and an incentive for
investors . . . locating services.”289 However, thus far there seems to be little
migration from American social networks to European or Asian ones, drawn
by stronger privacy regimes.
The legal moves described here in the United States have helped facilitate
the “wow” of the World Wide Web, but they might also usher in the “yuck.”
We need to ensure that in our zeal for promoting Internet enterprise, we do not
haphazardly create the conditions for a dystopia.

287 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001); Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Foreword: Is Nozick Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social
Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563, 575 (2007) (critiquing reliance on taxation to incorporate distributive
concerns).
288 This serves also to suggest a response to the claim that the assignment of the legal privilege will prove
irrelevant to the efficient distribution of resources in conditions of negligible transactions costs. See generally
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (discussing the collective action
problems surrounding transaction costs). Transaction costs here are in fact quite significant, often involving
millions of people in highly diverse conditions and across multiple jurisdictions. The task of privately
assembling the requisite rights with respect to such a broad array of persons—some of whom would not be on
the system at all—seems quite overwhelming.
289 Viviane Reding, The European Data Protection Framework for the Twenty-First Century, 2 INT’L
DATA PRIVACY L. 119, 129 (2012).
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CONCLUSION: THE HACKER WAY
Mark Zuckerberg calls his approach to innovation the “Hacker Way.”290
“Move fast and break things,” he tells Facebook’s designers and engineers.291
But because of Clinton, Congress, and the Courts, most of the time Facebook’s
amazing innovations did not break the law.
In the same month that Zuckerberg revealed this in the company’s IPO
prospectus, another major investment was made in a social media enterprise.
The Japanese firm Rakuten led a $100 million investment into Pinterest, a
website that allows an individual to copy any image across the web to post on
one’s own scrapbook page.292 Were it not for safe harbors in the law, Rakuten
would likely have been loath to invest in a company whose business model
relied on its users’ engaging in rampant copyright infringement. Even more
important, without such safe harbors, people everywhere would have been
denied a simple way to express themselves and to share what they love with
the world.
Facebook and Pinterest exemplify the “democratic experimentation” that
Lawrence Lessig foresaw in 1995 arising from the new cybertechnologies.293
While Lessig worried about stultifying regulation of this new medium,294 over
the next half-decade, we saw active intervention by both Congress and the
Courts, but largely designed to limit the reach of existing law. This made
possible the democratic experimentation of companies like Facebook and
Google, which introduced innovations subject largely to the approval or
disapproval of users rather than the law. A brilliant Japanese entrepreneur
during the same period might find the police knocking on the door.295

290

Facebook, Inc. Registration Statement, supra note 127, at 69 (letter from Mark Zuckerberg).
Id. at 70.
292 Tim Bradshaw, Rakuten Leads $100m Pinterest Investment, FIN. TIMES, May 17, 2012, http://www.ft.
com/intl/cms/s/0/440374a8-9ffa-11e1-94ba-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2fFRqUnZz.
293 Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1753 (1995). Jonathan Zittrain labels
the extent of the possibilities permitted by the legal and technological architecture “generativity.” JONATHAN
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 70 (2008).
294 Lessig, supra note 293, at 1752–53 (“A prudent Court—Supreme Court, that is—would find ways to
let these questions simmer for a while, to let the transition into this new space advance, before venturing too
boldly into its regulation.”).
295 See supra notes 158–67, 186–92 and accompanying text.
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